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INTRODUCTION
Faced with declining domestic cigarette sales and the rapid proliferation of
laws prohibiting smoking in indoor workplaces, the two largest U.S. cigarette
producers, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, have both made the strategic decision
to enter the smokeless tobacco market.1 In April 2006, Reynolds-American (parent
company of R.J. Reynolds) purchased Conwood Smokeless Tobacco Company, the
second largest smokeless tobacco company in the U.S. 2 The following month, R.J.
Reynolds announced that it would test-market Camel Snus, a "spit-free" smokeless
tobacco product, in Austin, Texas and Portland, Oregon. 3 Shortly thereafter, Philip
Morris announced that it would be introducing its own smokeless tobacco product
called Taboka. 4 Philip Morris is currently test-marketing this "spit-free" product in
Indianapolis, Indiana. 5 Then, in June 2007, Philip Morris lent its flagship cigarette
brand name to the smokeless effort, announcing that it would test-market a new
11 6
"spit-free" product called Marlboro Snus in the Dallas, Texas area.
This article will focus on the role that litigation may play in addressing the
cigarette companies' entrance into the smokeless tobacco market.7 Litigation has, at
least in the view of some, been an invaluable tool in the arsenal of anti-smoking
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1. Jane L. Levere, No Smoke, No Foul? Critics Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at C5.
2. With Purchase, Reynolds Moves into Smokeless Tobacco Market, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at
C9.
3. Levere, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Barnaby J. Feder, Philip Morris Tries Smokeless Tobacco Product in Texas, N.Y. TIMEs, June
9, 2007, at C3.
6. Id.
7. Although the new developments in the smokeless tobacco market have implications for
legislation and regulation as well, such measures are beyond the scope of this article.
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advocates. 8 Does it have an analogous role to play in reducing the negative effects
of smokeless tobacco? Can litigation push producers to make smokeless tobacco
products safer? Further, what impact will the cigarette companies' entrance into the
smokeless market have on ongoing smoking-related litigation? These are all
questions that public health advocates and attorneys are struggling to answer in
response to a rapidly-changing tobacco market.
Answering these questions is made more difficult by the ongoing debate in
public health circles about whether smokeless tobacco can be a form of "harm
reduction." 9 The concept of harm reduction as applied to smokeless tobacco posits
that the population-wide levels of harm caused by cigarettes could be reduced by
encouraging smokers (or at least smokers who have difficulty quitting by other
means) to switch to smokeless tobacco products.' 0 Many tobacco control advocates,
however, are strongly opposed to encouraging smokers to switch to smokeless
tobacco products for reasons that may be historical, strategic, or simply visceral.
Recently, the discussion and debate has only intensified, as exemplified by the
University of Maryland School of Law's symposium in April 2007 entitled "'Safer'
Tobacco Products: Reducing Harm or Giving False Hope?" As was clear at the
symposium (and in this symposium edition of the Journal), tobacco control
advocates on the two sides of this issue have starkly divergent views as to how to
proceed. This ongoing debate about the merits of a harm reduction strategy has
inhibited the ability of tobacco control advocates to develop a unified response to
the cigarette companies' decision to enter the smokeless tobacco market.
Without resolving the ultimate issues behind the debate, this article hopes to
find some common ground between harm reduction proponents and opponents on
the issue of litigation strategy. Litigation may be able to push the tobacco industry
towards safer smokeless tobacco products and more restrained marketing practices
-goals which should be universally shared by tobacco control advocates.
Moreover, the debate about the merits of harm reduction is enhanced-and, from
my perspective, becomes a closer call-if tobacco control advocates first work
together to eliminate unnecessary risks from smokeless tobacco products and
curtail irresponsible marketing practices.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly provides some background on
smokeless tobacco and the harm reduction debate. Part II discusses the marketing
of smokeless tobacco, since the way the product is marketed may have implications
for both litigation and potential harm reduction. The final sections of the article
8. E.g., Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Agency Tells Nations to Use the Courts to Combat Tobacco, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A15.
9. As it relates to tobacco, a "harm reduction" product is one that "lowers total tobacco-related
mortality and morbidity even though use of that product may involve continued exposure to tobacco-
related toxicants." INST. OF MED., CLEARING THE SMOKE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE FOR TOBACCO
HARM REDUCTION 2 (Kathleen Stratton et al. eds., 2001).
10. See id. at 39.
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examine three distinct legal issues raised by Philip Morris's and R.J. Reynolds's
entrance into the smokeless tobacco arena. Part III reviews the terms of the Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) and its applicability to smokeless tobacco sales, as
litigation to enforce the MSA's provisions may help reduce some of the potential
harms of smokeless tobacco. Part IV then considers potential legal liability that
tobacco companies could face for marketing smokeless tobacco products. Finally,
Part V discusses how the cigarette companies' entrance into the smokeless tobacco
market may end up impacting cigarette-related litigation.
I. HEALTH EFFECTS AND HARM REDUCTION
Both R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris are test-marketing "spit-free" products
(Camel Snus (RJR), Taboka (PM), and Marlboro Snus (PM)), a new type of
smokeless tobacco that comes in small, teabag-like pouches that are held between
the cheek and the gum.l' Unlike other types of smokeless tobacco, these products
do not require spitting, thus making discreet usage much easier. 12 As these products
are new, relatively little is known about how their impact on health may differ from
other smokeless tobacco products already on the market. 13
For smokeless tobacco in general, the U.S. Surgeon General has maintained
for more than twenty years that:
[O]ral use of smokeless tobacco represents a significant health risk. It is
not a safe substitute for smoking cigarettes. It can cause cancer and a
number of noncancerous oral conditions and can lead to nicotine
addiction and dependence.
14
In 2003, then-Surgeon General Richard Carmona reiterated in congressional
testimony that "smokeless tobacco remains a known threat to public health just as it
!1. Feder, supra note 5. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco-still the market leader in the smokeless tobacco
field-is testing its own spit-free products, Skoal Dry and Revel. Levere, supra note 1.
12. See Levere, supra note 1.
13. Although beyond the scope of this article, there are other forms of noncombustible oral tobacco
now entering the market that raise similar issues, such as Star Scientific Inc.'s Ariva tobacco lozenge.
According to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Ariva "comes in the shape of a candy-like product
and is packaged and marketed like a smoking cessation product." Press Release from Mathew L. Myers,
President, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, FDA Refuses to Act to Stop Sales of Ariva Tobacco Mints
Ruling Points Out Gaping Hole in Consumer Protection (Aug. 29, 2003), available at
http://tobaccofreekids.org/ScriptfDisplayPressRelease.php3?Display-683. R.J. Reynolds and Philip
Morris have not yet introduced similar products, but may do so in the future.
14. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF USING SMOKELESS
TOBACCO: A REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, at vii (1986),
available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/F/C/_/nnbbfc.pdf. Fact sheets on the web pages of the
Centers for Disease Control and the National Cancer Institute likewise emphasize the carcinogenic
effects of smokeless tobacco. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Fact Sheet, Smokeless Tobacco
Use, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/datastatistics/Factsheets/smokeless tobacco.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2007). Nat'l Cancer Inst., Fact Sheet, Smokeless Tobacco and Cancer: Questions and Answers,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Tobacco/smokeless (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
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was when Congress acted in 1986."1 5 He added that "[the] national toxicology
program of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) continues to classify smokeless
tobacco as a known human carcinogen, proven to cause cancer in people.'
16
Although smokeless tobacco is clearly a threat to oral hygiene and increases
the risk of oral cancer (though the degree of increased risk is subject to debate), it is
also undoubtedly less deadly than smoking. 17 To put it simply, although mouth
disease and oral cancers can be disfiguring and severely unpleasant, they are not
fatal to nearly the same degree as lung cancer and other cancers caused by
smoking.' 8 Moreover, although it is unclear how much smokeless tobacco increases
the risk of heart disease, its impact on the cardiovascular system is less than that of
smoking.' 9 Thus, for any individual cigarette smoker, switching from smoking to
smokeless tobacco would unquestionably reduce the odds of tobacco-related
mortality. 20 However, quitting entirely or switching to a "clean nicotine" product
(like nicotine gum or nicotine patches) would, of course, be even safer.2 1
There is substantial debate as to whether smokeless tobacco can serve as a
cessation aid for existing smokers, and thus reduce tobacco-related mortality on a
population-wide basis. According to the NIH's recent State-of-the-Science
statement, "[d]ata about the effectiveness of smokeless tobacco in facilitating
smoking cessation and associated population harm reduction are very limited.,
22
Indeed, there have been no randomized clinical trials testing the use of smokeless
15. Can Tobacco Cure Smoking? A Review of Tobacco Harm Reduction: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Protection, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong.
40-41 (2003) (statement of Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, Surgeon General of the United States),
available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_househearings&docid=f:87489.pdf.
16. Id. at 41.
17. See, e.g., Neil A. Accortt et al., Chronic Disease Mortality in a Cohort of Smokeless Tobacco
Users, 156 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 730, 736 (2002) ("Mortality for exclusive smokeless tobacco users is
considerably less than mortality for exclusive smokers for all cancer (especially lung cancer) .... ).
18. Compare Brad W. Neville & Terry A. Day, Oral Cancer and Precancerous Lesions, 52 CA
CANCER J. CLIN. 195, 196-98 (2002) (5-year survival rate for oral cancer in the U.S. is 50-55%, but
survival rate is substantially higher when diagnosed at an early stage), with D. Max Parkin et al., Global
Cancer Statistics, 2002, 55 CA CANCER J. CLIN. 75, 83 (2005) (5-year survival rate for lung cancer in
the U.S. is 15%).
19. Kjell Asplund, Smokeless Tobacco and Cardiovascular Disease, 45 PROGRESS IN
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES 383, 390 (2003).
20. Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Changing Smokeless Tobacco Products: New Tobacco-Delivery
Systems, 33 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. (Supp.) S368, S369 (2007) ("In a report by the Tobacco Advisory
Group of the Royal College of Physicians, smokeless tobacco use is considered 10-1000 times less
hazardous than cigarette smoking, depending on the product.").
21. S. Jane Henley et al., Tobacco-Related Disease Mortality Among Men Who Switched from
Cigarettes to Spit Tobacco, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 22, 27 (2007).
22. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NI STATE-OF-THE-SCIENCE CONFERENCE STATEMENT ON
TOBACCO USE: PREVENTION, CESSATION AND CoNTROL 13 (2006), available at
http://consensus.nih.gov/2006/TobaccoStatementFinalO90506.pdf
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tobacco as a cessation aid. 23 The experience in Sweden-where an increase in snus
usage has been accompanied by a decrease in smoking rates-is suggestive, but the
NIH cautions that "Scandinavian studies do not reflect the range of smokeless
tobacco products used or the diverse populations exposed to these products in the
United States."24
Although the concept of smokeless tobacco harm reduction remains
controversial, it has been warmly embraced by some tobacco control advocates. For
example, Coral Gartner and Wayne Hall recently wrote:
Based on the Swedish experience, there is a strong prima facie case on
public health and ethical grounds for recommending snus to inveterate
smokers who want to reduce their health risks and for considering
policies (such as lower taxes for snus and public information
campaigns) to promote its use by smokers.25
David Sweanor, Philip Alcabes, and Ernest Drucker are even more emphatic about
the potential benefits of tobacco harm reduction:
We can reduce tobacco related death and disease far more rapidly than
we can reasonably expect to reduce nicotine use by focusing on the fact
that people smoke for the nicotine but die from the smoke. Applying
harm reduction principles to public health policies on tobacco/nicotine is
more than simply a rational and humane policy. It is more than a
pragmatic response to a market that is, anyway, already in the process of
undergoing significant changes. It has the potential to lead to one of the
greatest public health breakthroughs in human history by fundamentally
changing the forecast of a billion cigarette-caused deaths this century.26
The other side of the debate does not dispute that smokeless tobacco is
significantly less harmful than cigarettes.27 However, there are at least two
significant reservations. First is the question of how much safer is it? The potential
benefits of a harm reduction policy depend largely on the relative risk of smokeless
23. Scott L. Tomar, Epidemiologic Perspectives on Smokeless Tobacco Marketing and Population
Harm, 33 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S387, S392 (2007) ("To date, there are no published randomized
clinical trials for smokeless tobacco as a smoking-cessation method.").
24. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 22, at 13; cf David A. Savitz et al., Public Health
Implications of Smokeless Tobacco Use as a Harm Reduction Strategy, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1934,
1935 (2006) ("The low smoking prevalence rate and the high rate of use of snus in Sweden may be
related, but this association has not been established with certainty.").
25. Coral E. Gartner et al., Should the Public Health Community Promote Smokeless Tobacco
(Snus) as a Harm Reduction Measure?, 4 PLOS MED. 1138, 1139 (2007), available at
http://medicine.plosjoumals.org/perlserv/?request-get-
document&doi = 10.1371%2Fjoumal.pmed.0040185.
26. David Sweanor et al., Editorial, Tobacco Harm Reduction: How Rational Public Policy Could
Transform a Pandemic, 18 INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 70, 74 (2006), available at
http://download.joumals.elsevierhealth.com/pdfs/j oumals/0955-3959/PllS0955395906002416.pdf
27. Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Smokeless Tobacco Use: Harm Reduction or Induction
Approach?, 38 PREVENTIVE MED. 309, 314 (2004).
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tobacco versus cigarette smoking, and also upon the relative risk of potential
alternatives. 28 Many of these factual questions remain unanswered, as Dorothy
Hatsukami and others suggest:
The extent to which [smokeless tobacco] imposes significantly greater
risk than current or future medications for smoking cessation is
unknown. Therefore, . . . the adverse effects and risk benefit ratio of
[smokeless tobacco] products and existing medications need to be tested
and determined, including the abuse liability and its effects on sustained
use of the products.29
In addition, given that the snus products being sold in the U.S. are new, untested,
and unregulated, some skepticism about their risk profile seems warranted. 3°
The second concern is that the tobacco companies' promotion of their
smokeless tobacco products could end up increasing overall tobacco exposure by
attracting new tobacco users or prompting "dual use" of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco.3' In particular, cigarette companies could use their smokeless tobacco
products (and the new spit-free "snus" products in particular) to (a) provide
smokers who would otherwise quit tobacco use entirely with a product that will
keep them using tobacco in another form; 32 (b) supply smokers who work in
smoke-free workplaces with a "bridge" product to get them through the day and
thus prevent them from quitting; 33 and/or (c) attract non-tobacco users (potentially
including kids and young adults) to habitual tobacco use which may or may not
lead to smoking.34 Any of these results could contribute to an overall increase in
population-level harm, despite the fact that switching from cigarette use to
smokeless tobacco would be a safer option for any individual tobacco user. 35 Simon
Chapman and Becky Freedman put the concern in blunt terms:
28. See Sweanor et al., supra note 26, at 72.
29. Hatsukami et al., supra note 27, at 314. "Abuse liability" refers to the likelihood that use of a
product will lead to addiction and dependence. INST. OF MED., supra note 9, at 258.
30. See Juhua Luo et al., Oral Use of Swedish Moist Snuff (Snus) and Risk for Cancer of the Mouth,
Lung, and Pancreas in Male Construction Workers: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 369 LANCET 2015,
2019 (2007) (finding that snus is associated with an increased risk of pancreatic cancer, but concluding
that "additional studies in populations with other patterns of use, not the least in women" are necessary
to properly assess the impact that increased snus use may have on public health).
31. Gartner et al., supra note 25, at 1139-40.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1139. It is surely no coincidence that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris are test marketing
their products in Austin and Indianapolis, two cities that recently enacted smoke-free workplace laws.
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 616, art. I-V (2005); AUSTIN, TEX., REV. ORDINANCES ch.
10, art. 1 (2004). Indeed, an R.J. Reynolds spokesperson, discussing the company's investment in
smokeless tobacco, told USA Today, "We're meeting consumer demand .... Smoking bans are making
it more difficult for adult smokers to enjoy a tobacco product." Wendy Koch, Tobacco Giants Test
Smoke-Free Products, USA TODAY, June 8, 2006, at IA.
34. See Gartner et al., supra note 25, at 1138.
35. Id. at 1139.
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Given the tobacco industry's long history of mendacity, we can be
certain that snus advertising will be used for the wider benefit of the
industry. For as long as both cigarettes and smokeless products are
marketed by the same companies, collateral benefits to be obtained from
riding the harm reduction moral imperative (such as dual use . . . ) will
be the foremost in cynical industry plans.
36
Indeed, as discussed in the following section, recent tobacco industry marketing
suggests that the potential benefits of harm reduction may be illusory so long as the
tobacco companies are in charge of marketing their products.
II. SMOKELESS TOBACCO MARKETING AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HARM
REDUCTION
The debate about smokeless tobacco harm reduction must be framed by a
realistic analysis of the ways in which smokeless tobacco products are being
advertised. The case for tobacco harm reduction is undermined when youth (and
especially youth who would otherwise not have smoked) are attracted to smokeless
tobacco.37 Likewise, the potential benefits of harm reduction disappear when
cigarette smokers use smokeless tobacco in addition to smoking, rather than
instead of smoking. Industry advertising suggests that both of these outcomes are
likely and intended results of current campaigns.
38
A. R.J. Reynolds
Camel Snus comes in three flavors: original, frost, and spice. 39 This echoes
R.J. Reynolds's past attempts to use flavored cigarettes as a way to attract a
younger audience. 40 As discussed in Part III below, R.J. Reynolds recently reached
a settlement agreement with the attorneys general of thirty-eight states in which
R.J. Reynolds agreed to discontinue the marketing of candy, fruit, and alcohol-
36. Id. at 1140. Opponents of smokeless tobacco harm reduction also argue that encouraging
smokeless tobacco use makes little sense when "clean nicotine" alternatives available do not carry the
same health risks. See, e.g., Hatsukami et al., supra note 27, at 315 (discussing the benefits of using a
"clean nicotine" alternative such as medicinal nicotine for tobacco addiction treatment).
37. Savitz et al., supra note 24, at 1937 ("The legitimacy of harm reduction is predicated on
effective targeting of active smokers .... Ideally, a product should not be promoted or adopted among
either nonusers of tobacco or active smokers capable of quitting .... If it is not possible to isolate and
market to the group of smokers who could benefit, there may be net harm from these products.").
38. Gartner et al., supra note 25, at 1140.
39. Camel Snus, http://www.camelsnus.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). Although the website
purports to limit access to adults, the age verification methods used are easily evaded. The website
appears to require only self-certification of one's age. Even if more rigorous procedures were used,
minors could easily avoid them by, for example, entering a parent's name.
40. AM. LUNG Ass'N, TOBACCO POLICY TREND ALERT, FROM JOE CAMEL TO KAUAI KOLADA-THE
MARKETING OF CANDY-FLAVORED CIGARETTES 1-4 (2006), available at
http://www.lungusa.org/atf/cf/%7B7A8D42C2-FCCA-4604-8ADE-
7F5D5E762256%7D/candyreport.pdf.
2008]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
flavored cigarettes. 41 The terms of the agreement, however, do not apply to
flavored smokeless tobacco products.42
The Camel Snus website uses imagery and wording that appears geared
towards teens and young adults. The latest version of the website features a blonde
Swedish swimsuit model named "Inga" who provides a video introduction to
Camel Snus and translates suggested phrases such as "Where is the nearest bar?"
into Swedish. 43 Inga's introduction boasts that the idea of Camel Snus came from
Sweden, which is better known for "deep tissue massage[s], those delicious
meatballs, dancing queens, and swimsuit models." 44 As for where Camel Snus can
be used, Inga helpfully suggests that "Snus doesn't require you to use your hands,
so you can snus while doing the samba.",45 Similarly, Camel's marketing materials
recommend using Camel Snus while engaging in various activities such as
"bicycling somewhere," "waiting in line to buy tickets to a comedy film," and
"sipping tropical drinks and pretending you are at a resort in Martinique."4 6 Clearly,
Camel Snus is not limiting its marketing to adult smokers.47
B. Philip Morris
Philip Morris, in line with its ongoing efforts to make itself over as a more
"responsible" tobacco company, has a much more restrained smokeless tobacco
website that does not contain music or animation similar to the Camel Snus site. 48 It
prominently presents links to discussions of "Preventing Youth Tobacco Use" and
"Health Issues." 49 In the section of its smokeless tobacco website entitled
"Marketing Approach," Philip Morris states that Taboka and Marlboro Snus are
41. Press Release, N.Y. Att'y Gen., Attorneys General and R.J. Reynolds Reach Historic
Settlement to End the Sale of Flavored Cigarettes (Oct. 11, 2006),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/oct/oct1 la_06.html.
42. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Settlement Agreement Regarding Investigated Cigarette Brand
Styles, at 1-2 (2006), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/oct/flavored%20settlement.final.pdf
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement Regarding Investigated Cigarette Brand Styles].
43. Camel Snus, supra note 39 (follow "All About Snus" hyperlink; then follow "Swedish
Translator" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2007).
44. Id. (follow "Meet Inga" hyperlink; then follow "Inga's Introduction to Snus" hyperlink) (last
visited Dec. 20, 2007).
45. Id.
46. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Advertisement, The Abridged Guide to Snusing (distributed with
copies of THE OTHER PAPER, a weekly alternative newspaper in Columbus, Ohio) (copy on file with
author).
47. Current advertising strategies appear to be targeted at young men. Young women, however,
may be the next targeted demographic. The New York Times recently reported that Swedish Match is
planning to introduce "a dainty lavender-colored can, packed with cassis and menthol-flavored snus."
Mark Landler & Andrew Martin, Smokeless from Sweden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at C1.
48. Philip Morris USA, Information About Smokeless Tobacco,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/smokeless (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
49. Id.
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"designed to appeal to the primary audience for these products: adult smokers who
are interested in smokeless tobacco alternatives to cigarettes.,
50
Taboka's marketing, while it does not appear to be as youth-oriented, does
seem to suggest that its product can be used "to tide smokers over when they are in
places they are not permitted to smoke.",5' For example, one of its direct mail pieces
stated, "Taboka is the smoke-free, spit-free tobacco pleasure you can enjoy almost
anywhere, anytime. Fancy that!",52 Notably, the mail piece also included a coupon
for a free pack of Taboka with any cigarette purchase. 53 If the goal of the
advertising was to encourage smokers to substitute smokeless tobacco for
cigarettes, it would be odd to require the purchase of cigarettes in order to get a free
package of Taboka.54
For its newer product, Marlboro Snus, Philip Morris is reportedly
contemplating the tagline "flavor anytime," which also highlights the idea that
smokeless tobacco can be used where smoking is no longer permitted." Moreover,
Philip Morris appears to be copying some of R.J. Reynolds's marketing tactics. Its
new product will use the Marlboro brand name (which may allow for easy cross-
promotion between cigarettes and smokeless products) and will come in four
flavors-rich, mild, mint, and spice. 6 (Taboka is offered only in "original" and
"green menthol" flavors.) 57
C. United States Smokeless Tobacco (USST)
USST's advertising is also important because, as the market leader in the
smokeless tobacco industry,58 both R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris will be
watching its actions closely. As discussed in Part III below, USST has a long
50. Philip Morris USA, Information About Smokeless Tobacco: Marketing Approach,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/smokeless/marketingapproach.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
51. Joe Nocera, If It's Good for Philip Morris, Can It Also Be Good for Public Health?, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., June 18, 2006, at 77 (citation omitted).
52. E-mail from Karla Sneegas, Executive Director, Indiana Tobacco Prevention & Cessation
(Sept. 21, 2006, 8:38 PM) (on file with author).
53. Id.
54. Likewise, Camel Snus's site does not discourage consumers from using both smokeless tobacco
and cigarettes. Its website asks "Can I Snus while smoking?" and answers, "[w]e do not recommend
that. You should enjoy all tobacco products in moderation." Camel Snus, supra note 39 (follow "All
About Snus" hyperlink; then follow "Got Questions?" hyperlink; then follow "Can I Use Snus While
Smoking?" hyperlink).
55. Vanessa O'Connell, Marlboro Brand Goes Smokeless: Philip Morris Takes a Risk By Selling
Tobacco Pouch; 'Reduced Exposure' Claim?, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007, at A3. Camel Snus employs
the similar tagline, "Pleasure for Wherever!" Camel Snus, supra note 39.
56. Philip Morris USA, Information About Smokeless Tobacco: Product Facts,
http://www.philipmonisusa.com/en/smokeless/product facts.asp?source=smokeless left nav (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007).
57. Id.
58. Levere, supra note 1.
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history of marketing to youth, which has resulted in several rounds of legal battles
with the California Attorney General.59 USST still promotes an astounding variety
of kid-tempting flavors of smokeless tobacco, including mint, wintergreen, cherry,
and apple.6° Its recent ads have clearly targeted smokers dealing with the
proliferation of smoke-free laws and policies. For example, one print ad says,
"Enjoy tobacco in the office? You bet." 61 Likewise, USST's marketing for its new
"spit-free" product, Revel, has included the tag line "a fresh new way to enjoy
tobacco when you can't smoke. 62 Whether these ads are intended to promote a
switch from smoking to smokeless tobacco use or the use of smokeless tobacco as a
bridge product in smoke-free settings is unclear. In 2000, however, USST's
president wrote that one of the company's objectives was "[p]romoting [d]ual
[c]onsumption" of smokeless tobacco and cigarettes among smokers adapting to
smoke-free laws.
6 3
59. E.g., Press Release, Cal. Office of Att'y Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Settles Lawsuit Over
Illegal Distribution of Smokeless Tobacco Products (Oct. 17, 2002),
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1005&category-tobacco [hereinafter Press Release, Cal.
Office of Att'y Gen. (Oct. 17, 2002)] (announcing settlement with company for illegally distributing
tobacco products on public grounds stating "free ... smokeless tobacco products inevitably wind up in
the hands of children"); Press Release, Cal. Office of Att'y Gen., Attorney General Reaches Settlement
with United States Tobacco Company Over Alleged Advertisement Violations (Dec. 6, 2000),
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=760&category-tobacco [hereinafter Press Release, Cal.
Office of Att'y Gen. (Dec. 6, 2000)].
60. UST Skoal, http://www.ustinc.com/smokeless/skoal/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
61. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Inc. Advertisement, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 2005, available at
http://www.tinketsandtrash.org/tearsheet.asp?ItemNum=210952. Another USST ad was equally direct,
stating, "[w]ith all the smoking areas removed from the building, Phil knew his best option was to head
straight for [smokeless tobacco]." U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. Advertisement, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24,
2005, available at http://www.trinketsandtrash.org/tearsheet.asp?ItemNum=210567.
62. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 108TH CONG., THE LESSONS OF "LIGHT" AND
"Low TAR" CIGARETTES: WITHOUT EFFECTIVE REGULATION, "REDUCED RISK" TOBACCO PRODUCTS
THREATEN PUBLIC HEALTH, at ii-iii (Comm. Print 2003), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040629082458-34684.pdf. Note that unlike R.J. Reynolds and
Philip Morris, USST does not have to worry about its smokeless products cannibalizing its cigarette
business. This likely explains why only USST has directly asked the U.S. government for permission to
advertise smokeless tobacco as a "harm reduction" product. Letter from Daniel C. Schwartz, Att'y for
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Feb. 5, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/smokelesscomments/reqadvisoryop.pdf; U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co.,
Comments of U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. Regarding Tobacco Harm Reduction Submitted to the U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 1-2 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.ustinc.com/files/regulatory/CommentsTobacco-HR.pdf ("USSTC believes that there is
support in the scientific and public health communities for the proposition that any comprehensive
evidence-based tobacco control program should include a tobacco harm reduction strategy [providing
that) . . .cigarette smokers who do not quit and do not use medicinal nicotine products should be
encouraged to switch completely to smokeless tobacco .... ").
63. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note 62, at 12.
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The point here is not to criticize the tobacco companies for marketing
strategies that undercut the goal of population-wide harm reduction. Their job is to
recruit new customers and sell more of their products, not to advance public health
goals. As long as their marketing is not deceptive, untruthful, or targeted to minors,
it is not unlawful.64 But this brief review of marketing strategies is meant to
highlight that as long as tobacco companies remain responsible for the marketing of
their products, it appears likely that the introduction of new smokeless tobacco
products (and the accompanying marketing campaigns) are more likely to increase
population-wide harm than decrease it.65 As shown, the tobacco companies are not
marketing smokeless tobacco as a product that will help current smokers quit.
66
Instead, they are trying to increase their customer base for tobacco products while
at the same time suggesting that current smokers may be able to use smokeless
tobacco and cigarettes. 67 The tobacco companies are simply following the dictates
of their own commercial interests, but these interests are often-if not always-in
conflict with the goals of tobacco harm reduction.
Nonetheless, this review of tobacco industry marketing suggests that harm
reduction advocates and opponents may be able to find some common ground in
the discussion of potential legal and regulatory responses to the cigarette
companies' smokeless sales. In particular, marketing geared towards youth and
advertising suggesting that smokeless tobacco and cigarettes can be used in
combination should be carefully monitored by tobacco control advocates for
compliance with all relevant laws and regulations. Such advertising could also be
the subject of future regulatory and litigation efforts. Although tobacco companies
will always have an incentive to increase their profits to the greatest degree
possible, legislation, regulation, and litigation can still help set limits around
acceptable tobacco company behavior. Tobacco control advocates have long called
for-and continue to call for-stricter limits on tobacco advertising for reasons
unrelated to harm reduction. But supporters of harm reduction may see that in
64. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Gail H. Javitt, Health Promotion and the First Amendment: Government
Control of the Informational Environment, 79 MILLBANK Q. 547, 562-63 (2001).
65. Cf COMM. ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND CONSEQUENCES, INST.
OF MED., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION, at 6-35 (2007
Prepublication Copy) ("The evidence clearly shows that youth exposure to images that create a positive
association with smoking is associated with a higher likelihood of smoking."). The IOM added that "[a]
review of tobacco industry documents confirmed that the companies have actively researched the
determinants of cessation, and based upon their findings, they engaged in marketing efforts expressly
designed to discourage current smokers from quitting and to encourage former smokers to relapse." Id.
There is no reason to believe that the impact of tobacco advertising-or the conduct of the tobacco
industry-would be any different with respect to smokeless tobacco. See id. at S-2.
66. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, supra note 62, at 12.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., COMM. ON REDUCING TOBACCO USE: STRATEGIES, BARRIERS, AND CONSEQUENCES,
supra note 65, at 6-39 to 6-41 (recommending restrictions on tobacco advertising without mentioning
harm reduction).
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addition to the inherent benefits of such measures, limits on smokeless tobacco
advertising strengthen the case for harm reduction by making it less likely that
tobacco marketing will increase population-level harm.
The following three sections of this article will focus on how the cigarette
companies' entrance into the smokeless tobacco market may have implications for
litigation. How should attorneys interested in public health respond to this
development? Can litigation play a role in reducing harm caused by smokeless
tobacco-either by reducing product advertising or encouraging safer products?
Moreover, will the cigarette companies' move into the smokeless tobacco market
strengthen or weaken their position in smoking-related litigation? First, though, the
next section will consider how the MSA (which resulted from previous litigation
against the tobacco industry) may constrain the tobacco companies' actions as they
move into the smokeless tobacco arena.
III. THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Although there is substantial debate about whether litigation is an effective
tool to reduce the harms of tobacco, there is no disagreement that tobacco
companies should be required to abide by their commitments in existing settlement
agreements. The largest and most significant agreement that applies to cigarette
companies is the MSA.69
In 1998, the major cigarette manufacturers signed the MSA-the largest civil
litigation settlement in history-in order to settle litigation brought by the attorneys
general of forty-six states. 70 The attorneys general, beginning with the Attorney
General of Mississippi in 1994, filed suits against the cigarette manufacturers
seeking to enforce state laws and recover the medical costs incurred in treating sick
and dying cigarette smokers.
71
69. E.g., Tobacco Pub. Policy Ctr., Capital Univ. Law Sch., Master Settlement Agreement,
http://www.law.capital.edu/Tobacco/federalmaster.asp [hereinafter Tobacco Pub. Policy Ctr.] (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007).
70. Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Master Settlement Agreement (1998), available at
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ [hereinafter Master Settlement Agreement]
(follow "Master Settlement Agreement" hyperlink) (see signature pages for list of states that signed the
agreement). Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas had previously reached separate settlement
agreements. JOY JOHNSON WILSON, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SUMMARY OF THE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL MASTER TOBACCO SET-rLEMENT AGREEMENT (1999),
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/tmsasumm.htm#lntro.
71. Tobacco Pub. Policy Ctr., supra note 69. The MSA was signed by the largest cigarette
manufacturers at the time: Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Lorillard Tobacco Company,
Philip Morris Incorporated, and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Other cigarette manufacturers have
subsequently signed onto the agreement. Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Project Tobacco, Participating
Manufacturers, http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/participatingmanu/ (follow "List of
Participating Manufacturers (updated September 24)" hyperlink).
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Under the agreement, the cigarette manufacturers agreed to pay the states
more than $200 billion over the first twenty-five years of the agreement and to
abide by certain advertising and marketing restrictions.72 In return, the states gave
up their legal claims against the cigarette manufacturers-including claims that the
manufacturers had been violating state consumer protection and antitrust laws for
decades.73
A. Does the Master Settlement Agreement Apply to Smokeless Tobacco
Marketing by Cigarette Companies?
"Tobacco products" are defined in the MSA as "[c]igarettes and smokeless
tobacco products. 74 Thus, the limitations on the promotion of "tobacco products"
detailed in Section III of the agreement-such as the prohibitions on youth
targeting and most outdoor advertising-apply to the advertising of both cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco, but only if the entity manufacturing the product is a party
to the agreement.75
Are the cigarette company affiliates now marketing smokeless tobacco
products bound by the MSA? The terms of the agreement apply to any
"Participating Manufacturer," which is defined as "a Tobacco Product
Manufacturer that is or becomes a signatory to this agreement" and its successors.76
"Tobacco Product Manufacturer" is then defined as:
[A]n entity that after the MSA Execution Date directly (and not
exclusively through an Affiliate):
(1) manufactures Cigarettes anywhere that such manufacturer intends to
be sold in the States... ;
(2) is the first purchaser anywhere for resale in the States of Cigarettes
manufactured anywhere that the manufacturer does not intend to be sold
in the states; or
(3) becomes a successor of an entity described in subsection (1) or (2)
above.
The term "Tobacco Product Manufacturer" shall not include an
Affiliate of a Tobacco Product Manufacturer unless such Affiliate itself
falls within any of subsections (1) - (3) above.77
72. Tobacco Pub. Policy Ctr., supra note 69.
73. Id.
74. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, § II(vv), at 13.
75. Id. § 111(a), (d), at 14-17.
76. Id. § II(jj), at 8-9.
77. Id. § II(uu), at 12-13 (emphasis added). Notably, "released party"-those against whom the
state released its potential claims, was defined more broadly as "all Participating Manufacturers, their
past, present and future Affiliates, and the respective divisions, officers, directors, employees,
representatives, insurers, lenders, underwriters, Tobacco-Related Organizations, trade associations,
suppliers, agents, auditors, advertising agencies, public relations entities, attorneys, retailers and
distributors of any Participating Manufacturer or of any such Affiliate (and the predecessors, heirs,
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In other words, if smokeless tobacco products are manufactured by the same
entity that manufactures cigarettes, then smokeless tobacco marketing is subject to
the terms of the MSA. But if smokeless tobacco products are manufactured by an
affiliate that does not manufacture cigarettes, then the terms of the MSA do not
apply.
78
In the case of R.J. Reynolds, the new Camel Snus product is being test-
marketed by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJRT), an MSA signatory and the
same company that manufacturers Camel cigarettes and other cigarette brands.
79
Thus, the MSA terms should apply to the marketing of Camel Snus. However, the
Conwood Smokeless Tobacco Company, which was purchased by Reynolds-
American International (RJRT's parent company), is being held as a separate
subsidiary which sells only smokeless tobacco and other non-cigarette tobacco
products. 80 Thus, it does not appear that Conwood is bound by the MSA's terms.
As for Philip Morris, Taboka and Marlboro Snus are being marketed by Philip
Morris USA, the same corporate entity that manufactures and sells Philip Morris's
multiple brands of cigarettes (Marlboro, Virginia Slims, Benson & Hedges, Merit,
etc.) in the U.S. 81 Therefore, the marketing of Taboka is subject to the terms of the
MSA, and Philip Morris has acknowledged this fact on its website.
82
executors, administrators, successors and assigns of each of the foregoing)[.]" Id. § II(oo). Thus, as
discussed in Part IV(B) below, the potential for future smokeless tobacco-related government suits
against cigarette manufacturers is quite limited, even though those companies were not manufacturing
smokeless tobacco at the time of the MSA.
78. Note that the Smokeless Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (STMSA) provides that if
USST (a company that only manufactures smokeless tobacco) decides to enter the cigarette market, it
must become a signatory to the MSA. Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Smokeless Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement 58-59, available at http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/lstmsa.pdf [hereinafter
Smokeless Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement]. The MSA does not include a similar provision
requiring signatories to become parties to the STMSA if they market smokeless tobacco products. See
Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70.
79. See WILSON, supra note 70 (indicating that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a MSA
signatory); Camel Snus, supra note 39 (indicating that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company markets Camel
Snus); CamelSmokes.com, http://www.smokerswelcome.com/CAM/dtclogin.jsp?brand=CAM (last
visited on Nov. 8, 2007) (indicating that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company produces Camel Cigarettes).
80. See Reynolds Am. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5, 7 (Feb. 27, 2007).
81. See Philip Morris USA, Marlboro Snus, New Product Fact Sheet,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/popupmarlboro-snus-fact sheet.asp?source=smokelessright nay
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007); Letter from Richard Cox, Vice President, Scientific Technical Servs., to Jan
Malcolm, Comm'r, Minn. Dept. of Health (Feb. 15, 2000), available at
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/product-facts/regulatory-reporting-requirements.asp (follow "2000
Report" hyperlink).
82. Philip Morris USA, Information About Smokeless Tobacco: Marketing Approach, supra note
50 ("PM USA already is a party to the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) and the prior settlement
agreements with Florida, Texas, Minnesota and Mississippi. The scope of these tobacco settlement
agreements (TSAs) and many of their provisions extend both to cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products. For example, the [TSA]'s advertising, marketing and promotion restrictions extend to both
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products.").
[VOL. 11!:7
TOBACCO LITIGATION WITHOUT THE SMOKE?
In short, the MSA applies to most of the smokeless tobacco products now
being marketed by the two largest cigarette companies, but not to all. This
obviously makes it difficult for tobacco control advocates and enforcement
agencies to track compliance with the agreement. In order to watch for violations,
they must know which products are manufactured by which parent company and
whether that parent company is subject to the MSA's terms.
This confusing landscape is further muddled by the fact that USST, the
market leader in smokeless tobacco sales, is the only signatory to the Smokeless
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (STMSA)." The STMSA imposes
essentially identical conduct restrictions on USST as the MSA, though it does not
require annual payments to the states. 84 Thus, USST's brands-Skoal, Copenhagen,
Revel 85 -must comply with the STMSA's marketing and advertising restrictions,
but other smokeless tobacco companies (unless they are also a cigarette company
bound by the MSA) need not.
An additional complicating factor is that the cigarette companies could
conceivably transfer their smokeless tobacco operations to separate affiliates to
evade the MSA's marketing restrictions. Active enforcement of the MSA's terms
may lead cigarette companies to consider this option.
- B. Relevant Provisions
For those smokeless tobacco products sold by R.J. Reynolds and Philip
Morris that are subject to the MSA's terms-namely Taboka, Marlboro Snus, and
Camel Snus-past experience suggests that there are several areas where marketing
should be closely monitored for potential MSA violations.
The need for vigilance is clear. In Judge Gladys Kessler's decision in the U.S.
Department of Justice's lawsuit against the major cigarette manufacturers, she
noted that "[t]he states' Attorneys General have complained to Philip Morris that
more than forty types of activities violate the MSA," and that "[s]everal courts have
held that RJR violated the MSA.' ,86 She added that "[d]efendants have not fully
complied with the letter or spirit of the MSA" and that future violations were
likely.87
83. Smokeless Tobacco Settlement Agreement, supra note 78 (see signature pages for list of
manufacturers that signed the agreement).
84. The STMSA does require payments to the American Legacy Foundation. Id. § VI(a), at 34.
85. See UST Inc. Company Profile, http://www.ustinc.com/smokeless/skoal (last visited Nov. 8,
2007).
86. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,845-46 (D.D.C. 2006).
87. Id. at 912-14.
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1. Youth Targeting
As discussed above, preventing smokeless tobacco companies from targeting
youth should be a goal shared by all, as no public health or harm reduction purpose
is served when youth who would otherwise not have used tobacco become addicted
to smokeless tobacco. The MSA broadly prohibits directly or indirectly targeting
underage youth in the "advertising, promotion or marketing of Tobacco Products"
(and, as discussed above, the definition of "Tobacco Products" includes smokeless
tobacco).88 Not surprisingly, however, the meaning of this "youth targeting"
provision has been the subject of substantial dispute, with the tobacco companies
frequently claiming that advertising which may appeal to youth is actually intended
to target young adults.
89
R.J. Reynolds, which is now producing Camel Snus, was involved in the most
heavily litigated case interpreting this provision. In 2001, the Attorney General of
California sued R.J. Reynolds, alleging that it was continuing to target youth by
advertising in magazines with substantial teen readership. 90 In 2002, the trial court
ruled against R.J. Reynolds, ordering it to pay a $20 million fine to the state. 9' The
judgment was upheld on appeal (although the amount of the award was not), 92 and
the two sides settled in December 2004. 93 In the settlement agreement, R.J.
Reynolds agreed not to advertise in publications where teens comprise more than
fifteen percent of the total readership, and it agreed to pay the state more than $17
million in fines and costs. 94 The terms of the agreement, however, apply only to
cigarette advertising; they do not apply to the advertising of smokeless tobacco
products.
95
One would hope that R.J. Reynolds learned its lesson in its litigation with
California and would not want to replay that episode. On the other hand, the
88. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, § HI(a), at 14.
89. Press Release, Ctr. for the Advancement of Health, Study Suggests Cigarette Companies Target
Youth (Dec. 20, 1999), http://www.hbns.org/newsrelease/studyl 2-20-99.cfn.
90. People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. GIC 764118, 2002 WL 1292994, at
*I (Cal. Super. Ct. June 6, 2002), affid, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Before the lawsuit
against R.J. Reynolds was filed, several other cigarette manufacturers modified or ended advertising
campaigns (such as Brown & Williamson's "B Kool" campaign) after a multi-state investigation by
attorneys general indicated that they appeared to be engaged in youth targeting. See DENNIS ECKHART,
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT:
ENFORCEMENT OF MARKETING RESTRICTIONS 5 (2004), available at
http://www.wmitchell.edu/tobaccolaw/resources/eckhart.pdf.
91. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2002 WL 1292994, at *10-11.
92. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 11 CalRptr. 3d at 321.
93. Press Release, Cal. Office of Att'y Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Announces Settlement with
R.J. Reynolds to Reduce Tobacco Ads Targeting Youths (Dec. 22, 2004),
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=852&category=tobacco.
94. Settlement Agreement regarding People v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., §§ 16, 22 (Dec. 22,
2004), http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cmsO4/04-147.pdf.
95. Id. at 4.
[VOL. 11:7
TOBACCO LITIGATION WITHOUT THE SMOKE?
company might seek to take advantage of the fact that its settlement agreement
does not cover smokeless tobacco, hoping that the states are no longer closely
monitoring advertising statistics. The states should carefully track the advertising of
Camel Snus (and Philip Morris's Taboka and Marlboro Snus) to ensure that R.J.
Reynolds does not return to its old ways. 96 Although the California appellate court
ruled that the state must show intent to target youth in order to prove a violation of
this section, it also found that marketing data can provide circumstantial evidence
of intent.97 It concluded that R.J. Reynolds had violated the youth targeting
provision because it "knew to a substantial certainty that its advertising was
exposed to youth to the same extent it was exposed to young adults."
98
Another type of youth targeting states that should monitor is the use of
flavorings to entice minors to try tobacco products. Following an extensive
investigation into R.J. Reynolds's marketing of flavored cigarettes, the attorneys
general of thirty-eight states reached a settlement agreement with R.J. Reynolds in
which it agreed to stop marketing a long list of flavored cigarette products (such as
Camel's "Dark Mint" and Kool's "Midnight Berry").99 The attorneys general had
alleged that marketing of these products violated the youth targeting provision of
the MSA.'00 Research of tobacco industry documents as well as product usage
statistics suggested that R.J. Reynolds was well aware that the flavored products
were of particular appeal to youth.101
Despite this recent settlement, R.J. Reynolds is still planning to market its
Camel Snus product in "frost" and "spice" flavors. 02 The orientation of its website
suggests that these flavors are targeted at young adults, if not minors. Using youth-
oriented slang, the website states, "Chill Out, FROST's 100% Fresh on
96. According to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, "despite the restrictions placed on youth
advertising by the [STMSA], [USST] has continued to heavily advertise in youth-oriented magazines."
CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, SMOKELESS TOBACCO IN THE UNITED STATES 3,
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/023 1.pdf. Because they are now directly
competing, this may put pressure on R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris to respond in kind.
97. R.J. Reynolds, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 327.
98. Id. at 327-28.
99. Settlement Agreement Regarding Investigated Cigarette Brand Styles, supra note 42, § II, at 4-
7.
100. Id. at 1.
101. E.g., Carrie M. Carpenter et al., New Cigarette Brands with Flavors that Appeal to Youth:
Tobacco Marketing Strategies, 24 1EALTH AFF. 1601, 1601-03 (2006) (reviewing internal tobacco
industry documents discussing flavored cigarettes); M. Jane Lewis & Olivia Wackowski, Dealing with
an Innovative Industry: A Look at Flavored Cigarettes Promoted by Mainstream Brands, 96 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 244, 244 (2006) ("Recent studies show that [flavored cigarette products produced by major
cigarette brands] are being used primarily by young people."); see generally AM. LUNG ASS'N, supra
note 40.
102. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, Is R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY A GOOD
CORPORATE CITIZEN? RECENT HISTORY SAYS NO 3 (2007),
http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/01 24.pdf.
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Purpose."' 03 Philip Morris-though its website does not contain the same youth-
oriented imagery-is also planning to sell Marlboro Snus in flavors like "mint" and
"spice," which may be targeted at minors. 104
USST's internal documents have shown that the company views flavored
products as "starter" products, and that smokeless tobacco users should be
"graduated" to more traditional smokeless tobacco products like Copenhagen (See
Fig. 1).1°5 As one former USST sales representatives not-so-subtly told the Wall
Street Journal, "Cherry Skoal is for somebody who likes the taste of candy, if you
know what I'm saying."'
0 6
~W5IAMI~dNATURAL.
7 :Fig. 1: United States Tobacco's (UST)
w.A ", A, "Graduation Process" (Source: Marsee
I - --- v. United States Tobacco Co., 639 F.
Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (UST
Document No. 12017104; Court
i Exhibit No. 100), aff'd, 866 F.2d 319
a AMMS is ~(10th Cir. 1989)).
Given the past activities of both R.J. Reynolds and USST-and particularly
given the recent settlement agreement signed by R.J. Reynolds-the flavoring of
smokeless tobacco would be an appropriate issue for the attorneys general to
investigate. The smokeless tobacco companies may argue that their flavorings are
merely intended to provide options for young adults, not to entice minors to start
103. Camel Snus, supra note 39 (follow "All About Snus" hyperlink; then follow "What is Snus"
hyperlink and watch flash presentation; then follow "Camel Snus frost" hyperlink).
104. Philip Morris USA, Marlboro Snus Fact Sheet,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/popupmarlboro-snus fact sheet.asp?source=smokeless-rightnav
(last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
105. E.g., Alix M. Freedman, Juiced Up: How a Tobacco Giant Doctors Snuff Brands to Boost Their
'Kick,' WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1994, at Al. If R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris are now planning to
"graduate" college-age tobacco users from flavored snus products to cigarette smoking, that would
clearly be a serious public health problem. Concerns that this may be part of the cigarette companies'
plans are heightened by their use of the Camel and Marlboro brand names to advertise their new snus
products.
106. Id. Like the MSA, the STMSA prohibits youth targeting. See Smokeless Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement, supra note 78, § 111(a), at 16.
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tobacco use. 10 7 Nonetheless, R.J. Reynolds's agreement to settle with the attorneys
general indicates that it considers itself somewhat vulnerable on this issue. An
enforcement action by the attorneys general may well lead to a similar settlement
that applies to smokeless tobacco products, and, at the very least, it would bring
public attention to the issue of targeting youth with flavored tobacco products.
In sum, there are significant grounds for concern that the cigarette companies
(R.J. Reynolds in particular) may market their new smokeless tobacco products in
ways that target youth in violation of Section 111(a) of the MSA. Indeed, such
violations may already be ongoing. As stated by Judge Kessler in her decision in
United States v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc.:
Defendants continue to engage in many practices which target youth,
and deny that they do so. Despite the provisions of the MSA,
Defendants continue to track youth behavior and preferences and market
to youth using imagery which appeals to the needs and desires of
adolescents. Defendants are well aware that over eighty percent of adult
smokers began smoking before the age of 18, and therefore know that
securing the youth market is critical to their survival. There is therefore
no reason, especially given their long history of denial and deceit, to
trust their assurances that they will not continue committing
[racketeering] violations denying their marketing to youth. 
108
Although Judge Kessler was referring to the cigarette market, there is a clear need
for vigilance to ensure that similar misconduct does not take place in the smokeless
tobacco market.
2. Free Giveaways
A separate part of Section III of the MSA prohibits the distribution of "any
free samples of Tobacco Products except in an Adult-Only Facility."' 0 9 Smokeless
tobacco companies, including USST and Swedish Match, have engaged in the
distribution of free smokeless tobacco products in "adults-only" tents at rodeos, car
races, fairs, and other public events." 0 Though these tents do not violate the MSA
107. The full text of MSA § 111(a) states that "[n]o Participating Manufacturer may take any action,
directly or indirectly, to target Youth within any Settling State in the advertising, promotion or
marketing of Tobacco Products, or take any action the primary purpose of which is to initiate, maintain
or increase in incidence of Youth smoking within any Settling State." Master Settlement Agreement,
supra note 70, § 111(a), at 14 (emphasis added). The tobacco companies may argue that the flavorings of
the products do not come within the terms of the first prohibition (because the language is limited to
"advertising, promotion or marketing") and that the second part of the prohibition only applies to
smoking. However, by focusing on the advertising and marketing of flavored products (rather than on
the flavoring of the products themselves), the attorneys general could likely overcome this objection.
108. 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,912 (D.D.C. 2006).
109. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, § 111(g), at 19.
110. See, e.g., SUSAN ALEXANDER, SPIT TOBACCO SPONSORSHIP OF RODEOS: A LITERATURE
REVIEW 3-5 (2002), available at http://www.bucktobacco.org/resources/docs/LitRev.pdf ("Often these
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or STMSA's "free giveaway" provisions if only adults are allowed access, they
would be prohibited if minors are allowed in."' If Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds
engage in similar promotional practices, states' attorneys general should ensure that
they abide by the terms of the MSA.
In 2001 and 2002, Swedish Match and USST reached separate settlements
with the State of California, which brought suits claiming that the companies had
violated state law by distributing free smokeless tobacco products at rodeos, fairs,
and car races."l 2 The companies agreed to pay fines totaling more than $500,000 to
settle the suits.113 Although at least in the case of USST, the free giveaways were in
adults-only tents or facilities (and thus violations of state law, but not of the MSA),
these settlements suggest that state or local laws could be effectively used to limit
the free distribution of smokeless tobacco products. 14 State and local laws would
also have the benefit of being more easily enforced than MSA violations. "'
5
3. Health Claims
The MSA also provides that "[n]o [p]articipating [m]anufacturer may make
any material misrepresentation of fact regarding the health consequences of using
any Tobacco Product .... .. 116 As Judge Kessler's decision found, both R.J.
Reynolds and Philip Morris participated in a decades-long scheme to deceive the
public with regard to the dangers of cigarette smoking, the addictiveness of
nicotine, the health effects of "light" cigarettes and secondhand smoke, and
tents are quite elaborate with mechanical bulls to increase attendance and create an even more appealing
'forbidden fruit' to children and adolescents unable to enter.").
111. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, § 111(g), at 19; Smokeless Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement, supra note 78, § HI, at 23-24.
112. Press Release, Cal. Office Att'y Gen., Attorney General Lockyer Announces Settlement of Free
Tobacco Samples Lawsuit (Jul. 13, 2001), http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1322; Press
Release, Cal. Office of Att'y Gen. (Oct. 17, 2002), supra note 59. In 2000, USST settled a separate
claim brought by the State of California. Press Release, Cal. Office Att'y Gen., Attorney General
Reaches Settlement with United States Tobacco Company Over Alleged Advertisement Violations (Dec.
6, 2000), http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=760. The claim accused the company of violating
state law by including a coupon for smokeless tobacco in advertisements printed in a California State
University student newspaper. Id.
113. Press Release, Cal. Office of Att'y Gen. (Oct. 17, 2002), supra note 59.
114. The recent decision in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Seattle-King County Dept. of Health, 473
F. Supp. 2d 1105 (W.D. Wash. 2007) brings into question the viability of local laws prohibiting
cigarette giveaways. The Court found the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 15
U.S.C. § 1334 (2000), preempts such laws. Id. at 1110. However, the FCLAA applies only to cigarettes.
Id. The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 has a much narrower
preemption provision. 15 U.S.C. § 4406 (2000). Thus, even if the Court of Appeals affirms the decision,
states and localities should still be free to enact laws that prohibit free giveaways of smokeless tobacco
products.
115. See discussion infra Part.ilI.C.
116. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, § I(r), at 28.
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more." 7 Moreover, the judge concluded that these fraudulent activities continued
well after the MSA was signed."' 8
Given this history, any hope that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris can be
relied on to provide truthful and non-misleading information about the health-
related risks of their smokeless tobacco products would have to be based on the
dubious proposition that these companies have radically reformed themselves."
9
Indeed, only recently, the State of Vermont sued R.J. Reynolds alleging that it had
violated the MSA's provisions by making false and misleading health claims about
"Eclipse" cigarettes (which heat, rather than bum, tobacco). 120 Litigation in that
case is still ongoing. 121
Thus far, both Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds have been cautious about
making health claims about their smokeless tobacco products. A previous version
of Camel Snus's website stated that there were only "potential" risks involved in
the use of smokeless tobacco, as opposed to "inherent" risks in the use of
cigarettes. 122 That section of the website has now been modified to say, "[w]e're
not making any health claims about this product. There are inherent risks with the
use of both cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. ' ' 123 Philip Morris has been
117. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,910 (D.D.C. 2006).
118. See, e.g., id. at 801 ("Defendants still continue to deny the full extent to which ETS can harm
nonsmokers and smokers."); id. at 208 ("From at least 1953 until at least 2000, each and every one of
these Defendants repeatedly, consistently, vigorously -- and falsely -- denied the existence of any
adverse health effects from smoking.").
119. Id. at 848 ("Defendants' assertions that, as a result of the MSA, they are now new companies
headed by changed management are simply not accurate.").
120. Compl. for Vermont v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 744-97 CNC & S-0816-98 (Vt. Super.
Ct. filed July 26, 2005), at 1,
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/upload/l125510625_VermontsComplaint and Petition.pdf.
121. In 1999, USST settled the State of Rhode Island's claim that it violated the STMSA by
claiming that smokeless tobacco had not been proven to cause oral cancer or other diseases. Laura
Meade Kirk, State Wins Admission from Tobacco Firm, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., May 11, 1999, at lB. In
the settlement agreement, USST withdrew the statement and agreed not to make similar statements in
the future. Id.
122. Camel Snus, supra note 39 (prior version visited June 13, 2007) (copy on file with author). In
June 2007, Reynolds American Incorporated (R.J. Reynolds's parent company) issued a carefully
worded statement suggesting that "[t]he growing body of scientific evidence on the continuum of risks
of the use of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products and other nicotine products requires serious
consideration ...." Reynolds Am. Inc., Reynolds American to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids:
Stick to the Facts II (June 13, 2007),
http://www.reynoldsamerican.com/NewsroomNViewHTML.aspx?postlD=1228. The statement did not
explicitly make any health-related claims for smokeless tobacco (though it cited a Lancet study
suggesting that the risk of pancreatic cancer was lower in smokeless tobacco users than in smokers). Id.
It added that "[R.J. Reynolds] believes that no tobacco product has been shown to be safe, and that
minors should never use tobacco products and adults who do not use or have quit using tobacco products
should not start." Id.
123. Camel Snus, supra note 39 (follow "Is snus safer than smoking cigarettes? Is snus safe?"
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
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more circumspect all along, stating on its website (and in its public statements) that
"[s]mokeless tobacco products are addictive and cause serious diseases.' 2 4
As discussed above, though smokeless tobacco carries its own health risks, it
is clearly less harmful (and certainly less fatal) than smoking.12 5 Nonetheless, no
public health or harm reduction purpose would be served by allowing tobacco
companies to make false or unverified claims about their smokeless tobacco
products. Nothing should bar the tobacco companies from accurately providing
information about the relative risks of smokeless tobacco versus smoking, but
given the troubling past actions of both R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris, the
statements of both of these companies should be carefully monitored for potential
false or misleading health claims.'2 6 The fact remains that spit-free tobacco
products are relatively new (extremely new in the U.S.) and may pose longer-term
risks that are not yet evident. The history of "light" and "low tar" cigarettes
(discussed in Part IV below) provides clear evidence of the need to exercise caution
and demand verifiable proof of any health-related claims.
C. The MSA Enforcement Process
Although MSA enforcement can be an effective mechanism for restraining
tobacco industry misconduct, its utility is limited by the facts that (1) enforcement
actions can only be brought by attorneys general of settling states (who may or may
not have the resources and time to conduct investigations and bring enforcement
actions), and (2) the MSA enforcement process is time-consuming, in part because
the agreement requires informal discussions with the company before an
enforcement action can be filed, and in part because any litigation against the
tobacco industry is likely to be an expensive and drawn-out affair.' 
27
Nonetheless, the discussion in this section highlights the need for tobacco
control advocates to understand the terms of the MSA and its application to
124. Philip Morris USA, Information About Smokeless Tobacco: Health Issues,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/smokeless/health issues.asp?source=smokeless left nay (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007). The statement on the website is ambiguous. It is unclear whether Philip Morris
endorses the statement or merely relays what the Surgeon General said about smokeless tobacco. In
either case, a Philip Morris spokesperson told the Wall Street Journal that "[s]mokeless tobacco causes
serious diseases and is addictive." Kevin Helliker, Changing Habits: Should Snuff Be Used as a Tool to
Quit Smoking?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2006, at Al. USST has been much more brazen in its health
claims, continuing to maintain (despite the Rhode Island settlement) that "it is [USST's] position that
smokeless tobacco has not been shown to be a cause of any human disease." Letter from Daniel C.
Schwartz, Att'y for U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Feb.
5, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/smokelesscomments/reqadvisoryop.pdf.
125. See Accortt et al, supra note 17.
126. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 383-84 (D.D.C. 2006)
(detailing numerous false statements made by company).
127. Id. at 914-15 (noting that MSA enforcement actions have taken four to five years to resolve in
some cases); see generally ECKHART, supra note 90, at 3-4 (discussing the enforcement process for
marketing restrictions under the Master Settlement Agreement).
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smokeless tobacco products. Tobacco control advocates should familiarize
themselves with the process for reporting MSA violations to the state attorney
general and should be willing to push for action when it is clear that MSA
violations have occurred. The need for active and aggressive enforcement has only
increased with the cigarette companies' entrance into the smokeless tobacco
market.
The conduct restrictions imposed by the MSA may not be as comprehensive
as necessary, but they provide a starting point for future regulatory efforts. 128 As
the increasing willingness of tobacco companies to settle MSA enforcement actions
suggests, the MSA-if aggressively enforced-can successfully reduce youth
targeting, misleading advertising, and other practices that harm public health. 129
Again, these are measures that both supporters and opponents of smokeless tobacco
harm reduction can endorse. Regardless of one's position on harm reduction, all
tobacco control advocates can agree that the cigarette companies should be held to
their prior commitments. The more difficult question is whether the cigarette
companies' entrance into smokeless tobacco will lead to a new wave of tobacco
litigation.
IV. POTENTIAL LITIGATION AGAINST SMOKELESS TOBACCO PRODUCERS
With R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris rolling out new smokeless tobacco
products, it is an appropriate time to examine whether they are taking on additional
litigation risks, and if so, how much effort tobacco control advocates should invest
in smokeless tobacco-related litigation. Can litigation play a part in helping to
reduce the usage of (and the harm from) smokeless tobacco products? 130 Can it
prevent tobacco companies from engaging in the type of misconduct evident in
their promotion of cigarettes? Can it push producers to make smokeless tobacco
products safer? Past experience from the smoking-related litigation suggests a few
areas where tobacco control advocates and public health attorneys may want to
focus their efforts.
Though they have received little attention, there have been several lawsuits
filed against smokeless tobacco producers for health-related claims, including
128. ECKHART, supra note 90, at 3.
129. See R. Daynard, Editorial, Why Tobacco Litigation?, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 1, 1 (2003).
130. There has been substantial debate about how much litigation can reduce or has reduced harms
caused by smoking. Compare Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in
REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 200 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) ("At no time ...
have litigation-associated costs operated as a rational scheme, from a regulatory perspective, in affecting
the demand for the product."), with Daynard, supra note 129, at 2 ("Litigation has achieved benefits for
tobacco control that were simply not obtainable otherwise. So long as the threat of litigation remains
viable, tobacco companies may be deterred from pursuing outrageous schemes that do not violate
specific laws or regulations."). There is sure to be a similar academic debate about smokeless tobacco
litigation.
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several cases filed in the past couple of years. 1 31 To this point, smokeless tobacco
companies have vigorously defended all claims, and they have not lost any major
case involving a health-related claim.
Since R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris are new to the smokeless tobacco field,
it does not appear that any litigation has been filed against them for health-related
claims (with the exception of pending cases against Conwood that are now the
responsibility of R.J. Reynolds). 32 Therefore, the discussion in this section relies
heavily on litigation filed against smokeless tobacco market leader USST as well as
precedents developed in cigarette litigation.
A. Class Actions
There are currently no pending health-related class action lawsuits against
USST or other smokeless tobacco companies. Dozens of smoking-related class
actions were filed against cigarette producers in the 1990s, but the tobacco industry
eventually succeeded in decertifying nearly all of them (requiring them to be filed
as individual cases, rather than as class actions). 133 The extremely expensive failure
of these lawsuits may explain why there are no pending class actions against
smokeless tobacco product manufacturers.
Vassallo v. United States Tobacco Co.134 provides an example of the
challenges that face potential class action suits against smokeless tobacco
manufacturers. Vassallo was filed in Florida state court in 2002 on behalf of all of
the state's residents who had been injured by smokeless tobacco.' 35 The suit -filed
by a high school coach who had developed oral cancer at age 27-included claims
for "negligence, strict liability, fraud and misrepresentation, civil conspiracy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, medical monitoring, and violation of
Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. ',13 6 The attorneys in the case
consciously modeled their complaint on Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the
Miami case in which a jury awarded $145 billion in punitive damages to a class
comprised of injured Florida smokers.137 The class in Engle, however, was
ultimately decertified and the massive punitive damages award was vacated. 138 The
131. E.g., Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2004); Marsee v. United
States Tobacco Co., 639 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986); In re Tobacco Litig., 624 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va.
2005).
132. Reynolds Am. Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 42 (May 4, 2007), http://sec.edgar-
online.com/2007/05/04/0000950144-07-004240/Section2.asp.
133. See Rabin, supra note 130, at 186-89.
134. Case No. 2002-28397-CA-0 1 (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. filed Nov. 12, 2002).
135. Rebecca Porter, First Class Action Filed Against Makers of Smokeless Tobacco Products,
TRIAL, Feb. 2003, at 80.
136. Id.
137. Id at 81.
138. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1277 (Fla. 2006).
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Florida Supreme Court-while allowing individual lawsuits by injured smokers to
go forward-wrote that class action treatment was inappropriate "because
individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and damages
predominate."' 39 Vassallo suffered a similar fate. The court decertified the class in
2005, but allowed the lawsuit to proceed as an individual claim. 140 Discovery in the
case is still ongoing.
141
Although several other types of class action claims have been brought against
USST, none have reached trial. 142 Just as concerns about individual issues of
causation, reliance, and damages have doomed nearly all smoking-related class
actions, it appears likely that tobacco companies will succeed in decertifying
smokeless tobacco-related class actions with the same types of arguments. 143 Thus,
it appears that by entering the smokeless tobacco market, R.J. Reynolds and Philip
Morris are not substantially increasing their potential exposure to high-stakes class
action lawsuits.
B. Government (Public) Suits
R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris also have little to fear from public suits
seeking to recover the costs of treating smokeless tobacco-related illnesses. The
states that signed the MSA have already released the companies from all
monetary [c]laims [including future claims] directly or indirectly based
on, arising out of or in any way related to, in whole or in part, the use of
or exposure to [t]obacco [p]roducts manufactured in the ordinary course
of business, including without limitation any future [c]laims for
reimbursement of health care costs allegedly associated with the use of
or exposure to [t]obacco [p]roducts.144
139. Id. at 1268 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. § 1.220(b)(3)).
140. Vassallo v. U.S. Tobacco Co., No. 2002-28937-CA-01 (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. filed Nov.
12, 2002), available at http://www.miami-
dadeclerk.com/civil/docketinfo.asp?pCase-Year=2002&pCase-Seq=28397&pCase Code=CA&pCase
Loc=01&id=AAAA8tAAIAAAWJXAA8.
141. Docket for Vassallo v. U.S. Tobacco Co., No. 2002-28937-CA-01, entry on Aug. 23, 2007 (Fla.
Miami-Dade County Ct. filed Nov. 12, 2002), http://www.miami-
dadeclerk.com/civil/docketinf.asp?pCase-Year-2002&pCase Seq=28397&pCase Code=CA&pCase
Loc=01&id=AAAA8tAAIAAAWJXAA8.
142. See, e.g., Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 847-48 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding dismissal
of plaintiffs' claims alleging that subscribers had to pay increased insurance premiums due to tobacco
companies' actions); Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 98-5518, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14495, at *4,
*15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1999) (dismissing complaint alleging that tobacco companies, including USST,
had illegally targeted African-American customers).
143. For a recent example, see Benedict v. Altria Group, Inc., No. 05-2306-CM, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24823, at * 11, *13 (D. Kan. Mar. 30, 2007), where the court denied class certification because
each individual plaintiff is required to establish reliance on tobacco industry misrepresentations.
144. Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, § II(nn)(2), at 10 (definition of "Released
Claims").
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Again, the definition of "Tobacco Products" includes smokeless tobacco
products.145 Thus, even though R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris did not produce
smokeless tobacco at the time the MSA was signed, the states have nonetheless
released those companies from liability related to health care costs associated with
the use of smokeless tobacco products.
Moreover, since concluding the MSA, the tobacco companies have been able
to successfully defend against claims by municipal governments and other third
party payors whose claims were not settled in the MSA.1 46 In general, courts have
found that third-party payors cannot recover for tobacco-related expenses because
their injuries are "too remote" from the tobacco industry's misconduct. 147 The
courts' legal reasoning is that the individuals injured by tobacco use are the most
appropriate parties to bring legal claims against the tobacco industry, not the third
party payors who ultimately pay for much of the healthcare. 148 It seems likely that
smokeless tobacco producers would be able to defend analogous suits on the same
legal grounds.
At the federal level, the U.S. government's Medicare cost-recovery suit
against cigarette manufacturers (the analogue to state suits that were settled in the
MSA) was dismissed on statutory grounds, which suggests that a similar suit
against smokeless tobacco manufacturers would result in the same outcome. 149 The
federal government did succeed in obtaining a judgment that the cigarette
manufacturers had committed racketeering offenses in violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), but that ruling was based on
evidence that the cigarette companies had engaged in a series of decades-long
145. Id. § 2(vv), at 13 (definition of "Tobacco Products").
146. E.g., County of Cook v. Philip Morris, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 1039, 1041, 1047-48 (I11. App. Ct.
2004) (upholding lower court's decision to bar claims already settled by the MSA and rejecting the
remaining claims by plaintiffs not covered by the MSA on remoteness grounds). There are minor
exceptions to this general rule. For example, in 2001, USST and other smokeless tobacco companies
agreed to pay $2.75 million to settle a suit brought by the City of San Francisco alleging that the
companies had failed to post warnings required by California law. Press Release, Office of S.F. City
Att'y, City, Environmental Law Foundation in Landmark Tobacco Settlement (Dec. 18, 2001),
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/cityattomey_page.asp?id=657. The tobacco industry settled with Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota in 1998, but subsequent health care insurers' lawsuits against the
tobacco industry were unsuccessful. Press Release, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minn., Blue Cross'
Historic Action Against Tobacco Industry Finally Concludes (Dec. 5, 2005),
http://www.preventionminnesota.com/objects/pdfs/NR PM%20launch%20_012006.pdf
147. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 818 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (N.Y. 2004);
see also International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 734 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 825-26
(7th Cir. 1999).
148. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 818 N.E.2d at 1145; International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 734, 196 F.3d 818 at 822. In practice, of course, individuals can rarely afford to pursue such
lawsuits. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv. 853,
867-68 (1992).
149. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).
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conspiracies to mislead the public. 50 The fact that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris
are new to the smokeless tobacco market suggests that they have not engaged in
any long-running scheme to defraud consumers with respect to smokeless cigarette
products.
Thus, it seems unlikely that high-profile public lawsuits will play a major role
in defining the trajectory of smokeless tobacco litigation, as they have with
cigarette-related litigation. Nonetheless, state attorneys general can still help to
ensure that harms resulting from smokeless tobacco are limited by enforcing the
terms of the MSA (as discussed above) and other relevant state consumer
protection statutes. Such cases are generally easier to prove than suits brought by
private individuals, because the attomeys general need only establish that the
prohibited conduct occurred-not that individual consumers were injured or relied
on misrepresentations.15' However, mustering the political will and the resources to
pursue action against the tobacco companies always remains a challenge.
C. Individual Lawsuits
1. Previous Smokeless Tobacco Litigation
Although there have been numerous successes in litigation against cigarette
producers, individual lawsuits against USST and other smokeless tobacco
producers have been entirely unsuccessful up to this point. If that trend continues, it
may be that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris are not assuming any additional
litigation risk by moving into the smokeless tobacco industry. However, as
discussed below, there is reason to believe that the smokeless tobacco companies'
unblemished record in litigation will not hold up indefinitely.
The only smokeless tobacco case to reach a jury, Marsee v. United States
Tobacco Co., occurred more than twenty years ago and resulted in a verdict for the
defendant tobacco company. 5 2 In Marsee, the plaintiff was a mother bringing a
products liability action on behalf of her deceased son, who had developed oral
cancer at the age of eighteen and died less than a year later.153 USST successfully
defended the case on the grounds that the decedent's cancer was not caused by
smokeless tobacco use. 154 Specifically, it argued that "plaintiffs use of snuff did
150. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1,851-53 (D.D.C. 2006).
151. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17537.3 (West 2007) (prohibiting smokeless tobacco
promotional offers or advertising programs that involve the distribution of free samples of smokeless
tobacco products "within a two block radius of... schools, clubhouses, and youth centers ....").
152. 866 F.2d 319, 321 (10th Cir. 1989). The trial occurred in 1986. Marsee v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,
639 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
153. Marsee, 866 F.2d at 321.
154. See id.
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not coincide with the location of his tongue cancer.' 55 Despite the adverse ruling,
it was notable that the plaintiff was able to take the case all the way to trial, and
tobacco litigation expert Robert Rabin suggested that the negative outcome of the
case was merely the result of poor case selection.' 56 The partial success of Marsee
would seem to have presaged additional legal attacks on the smokeless tobacco
industry, but twenty years later, no other health-related case has made it to trial.
The 2004 decision by the Eighth Circuit in Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
15 7
provides a good outline of some of the difficulties plaintiffs encounter in such
cases. Gloria Tuttle filed suit in 1999 in Minnesota state court as trustee of her late
husband's estate.' 58 Her husband, Bill Tuttle, had begun chewing smokeless
tobacco as a young professional baseball player in 1955.159 His brand of choice was
Beech-Nut, which for a time was owned by Lorillard.160 He developed oral cancer
in 1993 and died of related complications in 1998.161 The lawsuit alleged "common
law claims of negligence, fraud, and civil conspiracy, as well as statutory claims
based on several Minnesota consumer protection statutes."'
' 62
After the case was removed to federal court, the district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding that many of the claims were barred
by the applicable statutes of limitation.1 63 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding that even if Ms. Tuttle's statutory
claims were not time-barred, the claims "fail for want of proof of a causal nexus
between the defendants' conduct and [Mr.] Tuttle's injuries."' 64 Specifically, Tuttle
had alleged that the defendants "negligently misrepresented the addictive and
injurious effects of using smokeless tobacco," starting with the "Frank Statement"
in 1954.165 The Court wrote that even if such allegations were true, Mrs. Tuttle
155. Sharon Milberger et al., Tobacco Manufacturers' Defense Against Plaintiffs' Claims of Cancer
Causation: Throwing Mud at the Wall and Hoping Some of It Will Stick, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iv 17,
iv21 (2006).
156. Rabin, supra note 130, at 870.
157. 377 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2004).
158. Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957 (D. Minn. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd
inpart, 377 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2004).
159. Tuttle, 377 F.3d at 919.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Tuttle, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 961-65. The district court found that the limitations period for the
plaintiffs strict liability and warranty claims had expired. Id. at 963. Additionally, the court held that the
plainttiff failed to plead her fraud claims with sufficient particularity and failed to establish that Lorillard
had a duty to smokeless tobacco users. Id. at 963-65.
164. Tuttle, 377 F.3d at 926-27.
165. Id. at 922-23. In the "Frank Statement," published as a full-page ad in more than 300
newspapers around the country in January 1954, the tobacco industry (including Lorillard, Philip Morris,
R.J. Reynolds and USST's predecessor) wrote, "[w]e accept an interest in people's health as a basic
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could not prove that her husband had actually read and relied upon such
statements. 166 The negligent failure to warn claims were likewise rejected because
Mrs. Tuttle could not offer "admissible evidence [that he] would have acted
differently had the manufacturers provided adequate warnings."' 167 The Court-
dismissing without thought the issue of addiction-added in a footnote that since
Tuttle continued to use smokeless tobacco after federal law required warning labels
on such products in 1987, the claim that he relied on the tobacco companies' lack
of warnings was undercut. 168 Finally, the fraud and conspiracy claims were rejected
on similar grounds: Tuttle could not prove reliance on any allegedly fraudulent
statements, and she could not prove "a causal nexus between the defendants'
conduct and Tuttle's injuries."' 169
Such concerns-in tort law terms, reliance and causation-have been
insurmountable stumbling blocks in countless smoking-related cases. 170 In short,
even if misconduct by the smokeless tobacco producers can be sufficiently alleged,
the plaintiff must show that he or she actually relied on those actions and that the
result would have been different (e.g., the plaintiff would not have used the product
and developed cancer) had the company acted differently. 171 Such counterfactual
propositions are notoriously difficult to prove. Moreover, even if these barriers can
be overcome, the "try the plaintiff' strategy that cigarette companies have used to
responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. We believe the products we make
are not injurious to health." Id.
166. Id. at 923-24.
167. Id. at 924.
168. Id. at 925 n.6.
169. Id. at 926-27.
170. E.g., Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming
dismissal of smoking-related case for failure to establish reliance on alleged misrepresentations); Insolia
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Because none of the plaintiffs could recall a
single statement from the tobacco industry about the effects of smoking, [the District Court] stamped out
their original fraud claims for lack of proof of reliance and causation."); Alvarez v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 61, 77 (D.P.R. 2004) ("Plaintiffs' fraud claim is without merit because (1)
there is no evidence that the Decedent ever heard any allegedly false statements made by Reynolds; (2)
there is no evidence that the Decedent relied on any alleged misstatements made by Reynolds in his
decision to begin or continue smoking; and (3) even if there were some evidence that Decedent had
relied on some allegedly false statement, any such reliance would be unreasonable in light of (a) the
long-standing common knowledge of the health risks, including cancer, associated with smoking, (b) the
Surgeon General's Warnings that have appeared on all Reynolds's cigarette packages since 1966, and (c)
the wamings the Decedent himself read regarding the health hazards and addictiveness of smoking.").
171. E.g., Tuttle, 377 F.3d at 924.
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such success can still be employed. 172 The plaintiff can be charged with "assuming
the risk" of injury by choosing to use an inherently dangerous product. 173
Although it is certainly possible that plaintiffs in a similar case such as
Vassallo (described above and now proceeding as an individual claim) may prevail,
it seems likely that claims based on tobacco industry misconduct face long odds. In
smoking-related cases, victories for plaintiffs came only after an avalanche of
documentation demonstrated a clearly intentional, decades-long conspiracy to
deceive the public about the dangers of smoking.' 74 Although USST has made
questionable claims about the health effects of smokeless tobacco, no comparable
conspiracy has been established with regard to smokeless tobacco. Moreover, R.J.
Reynolds and Philip Morris are new to the smokeless tobacco market and appear to
be issuing only carefully guarded statements about the health impact of their
products. 75 Thus, causes of action against R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris alleging
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, negligent failure to warn, or similar claims are
unlikely to succeed in the absence of the disclosure of damaging internal
documents.
2. The Lessons of "Light" and "Low Tar" Cigarettes
Although the prospects for class action lawsuits and most individual cases
against smokeless tobacco manufacturers look bleak, it may be useful to keep a
172. Sara D. Guardino & Richard A. Daynard, Punishing Tobacco Industry Misconduct: The Case
for Exceeding a Single Digit Ratio Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages, 67 U. PiTn-. L. REV.
1, 36-37 (2005) ("[The tobacco] industry routinely puts the plaintiff in a smoking and health case on
trial .... Essentially, the companies 'muck around in the past until they find something damaging,' and
'[t]hen they play on it until the suit is dropped."') (citation omitted).
173. Unlike in cigarette cases, negligent failure to wam claims with regard to smokeless tobacco
products are not preempted by federal law. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 1, 7, 100 Stat. 30, 34 (1989) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4406
(2000)) ("Nothing in this Act shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State
statutory law to any other person."). However, as footnote 6 in Tuttle suggests, such claims would be
nearly impossible to win for individuals who started using smokeless tobacco products after 1987 (and
even, perhaps for those who continued using smokeless tobacco products after 1987). See supra note
168 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 852 (D.D.C. 2006)
("[O]ver the course of more than 50 years, Defendants lied, misrepresented, and deceived the American
public, including smokers and the young people they avidly sought as "replacement smokers," about the
devastating health effects of smoking and environmental tobacco smoke, they suppressed research, they
destroyed documents, they manipulated the use of nicotine so as to increase and perpetuate addiction,
they distorted the truth about low tar and light cigarettes so as to discourage smokers from quitting, and
they abused the legal system in order to achieve their goal-to make money with little, if any, regard for
individual illness and suffering, soaring health costs, or the integrity of the legal system.").
175. For example, the Camel Snus website states, "[w]e're not making any health claims about this
product. There are inherent risks with the use of both cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. U.S.
Surgeon General Warnings are required to be printed on packaging for both categories of products."
Camel Snus, supra note 39 (follow "Is snus safer than smoking cigarettes? Is snus safe? (Any similar
health-related question.)" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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longer-term, historically-informed perspective in mind. In particular, the disastrous
history of "light" and "low tar" cigarettes should give pause to both the industry's
attorneys and harm reduction advocates who view Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds
as potential partners.
Faced with mounting evidence of the connection between smoking and
disease, the cigarette manufacturers developed "light" and "low tar" cigarettes in
the late 1960s to allay health fears. 176 Many public health groups saw this as a
positive development and urged smokers who were unable to quit to switch to
"light" or "low tar" cigarettes. 177 As late as 1981, the Surgeon General's report
stated that "smokers who are unwilling or as yet unable to quit are well advised to
switch to cigarettes yielding less 'tar' and nicotine, provided they do not increase
their smoking or change their smoking in other ways."'' 7 8 The cigarette companies,
however, were well aware that smokers of "light" and "low tar" cigarettes would
"compensate" for reduced nicotine levels by "breathing more deeply, taking more
puffs, or blocking the ventilation holes of cigarette filters," thus negating any
potential health benefits. 179 Nonetheless, their marketing "featured claims of
lowered tar and nicotine accompanied by written statements that implied a health
benefit as a result of the lowered tar levels."' 80 As Judge Kessler concluded in the
Justice Department lawsuit:
By engaging in this deception, Defendants dramatically increased their
sales of low tar/light cigarettes, assuaged the fears of smokers about the
health risks of smoking, and sustained corporate revenues in the face of
mounting evidence about the health dangers of smoking.' 
8
'
The result was nothing short of a public health catastrophe.
The history of "light" and "low tar" cigarettes has implications for both
litigation and harm reduction. In terms of litigation, the tobacco companies have
faced a significant number of lawsuits over their "light" and "low tar" deception
during the last decade.'8 2 Though the industry has prevailed in most of these cases,
it has lost several sizeable verdicts and there are still several class action lawsuits
pending. 8 3 These litigation costs could not have been foreseen (at least by
176. E.g., Christopher N. Banthin, Potentially Reduced Exposure Cigarettes: The Need for a Public
Health Policy, 8 MINN. J.L. SCL & TECH. 127, 139 (2007).
177. Amy Fairchild & James Colgrove, Out of the Ashes: The Life, Death, and Rebirth of the
"'Safer" Cigarette in the United States, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 192, 193-194 (2004).
178. OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, at v (1981), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/sgr/sgr_2004/chapters.htm.
179. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM, supra note 62, at 6.
180. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 508 (D.D.C. 2006).
181. Id. at 561.
182. E.g., United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 137-38 (D.D.C. 2000).
183. See generally Allison Torres Burtka, Courts Stamp Out Industry Claims About 'Light'
Cigarettes, TRIAL, Dec. 1, 2006, at 14, 16-18 (reviewing adjudicated and pending tobacco litigation
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observers outside of the tobacco industry itself) when the industry began marketing
"light" and "low tar" cigarettes, as it took decades for the public health community
to fully realize that "light" and "low tar" cigarettes were not safer than conventional
cigarettes. 84 Similarly, the dangers of new smokeless tobacco products cannot be
fully determined for decades. If the new smokeless tobacco products are hazardous
in ways that take years or decades to become visible, then there may be substantial
costs-both in terms of litigation and public health-that will materialize in the
future. R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris (and their attorneys) have presumably
considered this possibility and nonetheless opted to enter the smokeless tobacco
market.
The history of "light" and "low tar" cigarettes also impacts the debate
regarding harm reduction promotion. Not only is there an issue of latent risks, but
the tobacco companies have already shown themselves to be skilled producers of
deliberately misleading advertising. In addition, they have previously undermined
cessation efforts by encouraging tobacco users to migrate towards alternative
products. Whether the involvement of Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds in
perpetrating the "light" and "low tar" fraud should disqualify those companies from
working with the public health community in pursuit of harm reduction objectives
is a subject of debate. At the very least, the historical background should make
public health advocates wary of heading down that road.
3. Product Liability Cases and Prospects for Future Lawsuits
As discussed above, R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris do not appear to be
assuming much short-term litigation exposure with their entry into the smokeless
tobacco industry. But the coast is not entirely clear. An ongoing Connecticut case,
Hill v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co.,185 suggests some areas where private lawsuits
against smokeless tobacco producers may yield more success-and where litigation
may produce public health benefits as well.
Although the complaint in Hill includes many elements that sound in
negligence or fraud, it is essentially a products liability claim based on
Connecticut's Product Liability Act.' 86 The suit was filed in March 2005 by Kelly
June Hill on behalf of the estate of her deceased husband, Bobby Hill. '87 According
to the complaint, Bobby Hill began using smokeless tobacco at the age of 13 in
cases involving "light" cigarettes). The most notable pending case is Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The judge in that case certified a nationwide class of "light"
cigarette smokers. Id. at 1131-32. If that class certification is upheld and the tobacco industry is found
liable, the judgment could amount to billions of dollars.
184. Fairchild & Colgrove, supra note 177, at 197-98.
185. No. X05CV054003788S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1842 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2006).
186. See Am. Compl. for Hill, 2006 Conn. Super LEXIS 1842 [hereinafter Am. Hill Compl.].
187. Id. 2-3; Docket for Hill v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., No. FST-CV-05-003788-S (Conn.
Super. Ct. filed March 7, 2005).
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1974.188 He continued using smokeless tobacco until he was diagnosed with tongue
cancer in 2002.189 He died a year later from related complications at the age of
41.190 In June 2006, the judge denied USST's motion to dismiss the complaint
(although some of the counts were dismissed), and the case is currently in the
discovery phase. 191
In addition to theories alleged in cases like Marsee and Tuttle, much of the
complaint is focused on the smokeless tobacco product itself 192 In order to prevail
on a products liability cause of action, Hill will have to establish that the smokeless
tobacco "was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or
user" and that such a defect was responsible for Hill's injuries.' 93 Moreover, with a
product like smokeless tobacco-which is known to carry a health risk (and indeed
has since 1987 had warning labels printed on the packaging)-the plaintiff is
typically required to show that the product was dangerous "beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it."'
194
In Hill, the complaint alleges:
UST Inc. [USST's parent company] intentionally failed and refused to
implement changes in the design, formulation and preparation of the spit
tobacco used by Bobby Hill that it knew would have, and that in fact
would have, reduced the addictive, harmful and deadly nature of the
product.
UST Inc. failed and refused to reduce nicotine specific nitrosamines
(NNN) in spit tobacco products, including products used by Bobby Hill,
even though it was well known to the company's senior management
and research chemists that nitrosamines were associated with cancer and
that UST Inc.'s spit tobacco products contained large amounts of
nitrosamines ....
Even though UST Inc.'s own chemists knew that it may be possible to
prevent additional formation of NNN in tobacco with time, and even
though it was, in fact, possible to reduce the amount of NNN in its spit
tobacco products, UST Inc. failed and refused to do so.195
188. Am. Hill Compl., supra note 186, 8.
189. See id. 9-12.
190. Id. 12, 24.
191. Hill v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., No. X05CV054003788S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1842,
at *1, *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 19, 2006).
192. Am. Hill Compl., supra note 186, 34-92.
193. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 (Conn. 1997) (interpreting
Connecticut's products liability law).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
195. Am. Hill Compl., supra note 186, at 60, 61, 64.
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The complaint further claims that UST (a) manipulated the pH balances in its
products in order to increase the level of "free nicotine" (nicotine that can be easily
absorbed), and (b) knew that the pH level of UST's products would increase while
it aged on store shelves.' 
96
These allegations in the complaint closely echo claims made by the plaintiff
in one of the successful "light" cigarette actions, Schwarz v. Philip Morris.197 In
Schwarz, the plaintiff won a jury verdict of more than $150 million in a case
alleging both fraud and products liability causes of action against Philip Morris for
its sale of the "light" cigarettes that ultimately caused Richard Schwarz's lung
cancer.198 Although the award of damages was overturned by the appellate court
because of faulty jury instructions, the findings of liability were upheld.199
In its product liability cause of action, the plaintiff in Schwarz had alleged:
At all material times, the cigarettes sold by defendant were defective
and unreasonably dangerous in one or more of the following respects:
a. The cigarettes contained added ammonia to increase the effects of
nicotine;
b. The cigarettes or their smoke contained altered pH so as to increase
the effects of nicotine;
c. At the time defendant's light cigarettes were sold, the product was
dangerous and in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer in that it was manufactured, marketed, and sold as a less
harmful alternative to ordinary cigarettes.
200
The appellate court in Schwarz upheld the jury's finding that Philip Morris
had violated Oregon's product liability statute by engaging in the conduct alleged
in the complaint. 20 1 The court wrote that "a reasonable consumer would expect
cigarette products to be dangerous, in part because of the federally required
196. Id. at 34-45. Some similar claims (though alleged with less detail) were made in Smith v.
UST, Inc., No. 04-CV-00170-BLW-MHW (D. Idaho, filed April 5, 2004). That case was brought by
Susan Smith, wife of deceased rodeo rider Kent Cooper. Smith Complaint, 1.1- 1.3. Cooper died at age
47 from throat cancer, after using Copenhagen from the time he was 13 years old. Id. 2.2. Smith
alleged that "Copenhagen snuff has an extraordinarily high concentration of those components of spit
tobacco that carry the greatest risk of causing cancer to users of their products and Copenhagen snuff
poses an unreasonable risk of disease to users, and is in fact more likely to cause disease to users than
almost any other brand of moist snuff available to U.S. customers." Id. 2.13. Despite predictions that
the Smith case would "blow the doors open on the relationship between this drug and [rodeo]," the Smith
case quietly settled in April 2007. Timothy Egan, Taking Aim at the Professional Rodeo Circuit's Drug
of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A14 (citation omitted). UST agreed to pay Smith's attorneys'
fees; other terms of the agreement are sealed. UST Inc., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 41 (May 4,
2007).
197. 135 P.3d 409,415 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
198. Id. at 415.
199. Id. at 425, 433.
200. Id. at 436 (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 437-38.
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warnings and in part because of other readily available information. '" 20 2
Nonetheless, liability still existed in this case because the "light" cigarettes were
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which . . . consumer[s] would have
[reasonably] expected" because of the defendant's manipulation of the product.20 3
In general, Schwarz remains the exception to the rule, in that several other
"lights" cases have either been dismissed or had jury verdicts overturned by
appellate courts. 204 It does suggest, however, that narrowly focused legal actions
that attack the "defective design" of the product may be able to overcome issues of
reliance and causation that have hampered negligence-focused or fraud-focused
actions.
Moreover, in the case of Hill and other similar smokeless tobacco cases,
product liability claims based on an "unreasonably dangerous design" may be even
more persuasive, given the emerging evidence suggesting that snus products in
Sweden are in fact lower in carcinogens than their U.S. counterparts.2 5 Such
findings suggest that there is a "feasible alternative design" that is readily available
to U.S. manufacturers. 20 6 In states that use the "risk-utility test" to determine
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, evidence of a "feasible alternative
design" can help push the balance in the plaintiffs favor.
20 7
As Dorothy Hatsukami and others have written, "[t]he rate of oral cancer is
highly likely to be contingent upon the level of tobacco specific N-nitrosamines
(TSNAs) in the [smokeless tobacco] products. Some countries such as Sweden
have [smokeless tobacco] products with relatively low nitrosamine levels compared
to other nations such as the United States." 20 8 The difference is apparently the result
of different manufacturing processes. Swedish snus is dried and heat treated, and
202. Id. at 437.
203. Id.
204. E.g., Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 6 (tIl. 2005) (overturning $10 billion verdict in
"lights" case); Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D. Me. 2006) (granting summary
judgment for defendants in "lights" case due to federal preemption).
205. Hatsukami et al., supra note 27, at 310.
206. The comparison between smokeless tobacco manufactured in the United States and the less
carcinogenic smokeless tobacco manufactured in Sweden could be a useful tool in prospective litigation.
Cf Connally v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (S.D. Ala. 1999) ("A manufacturer is
liable for injuries resulting from an inherently dangerous product, such as a saw, only if the plaintiff can
prove 'that a safer, practical, alternative design was available to the manufacturer at the time it
manufactured the product."') (quoting Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So.2d 447, 450 (Ala.
1991)). Ultimately, the plaintiff must present evidence that "the utility of the alternative design
outweighed the utility of the alternative actually used." Id. at 1138 (quoting Beech, 584 So.2d at 450).
207. Artis v. Corona Corp. of Japan, 703 A.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. 1997) ("[T]he plaintiff must 'show
the risks, costs, and benefits of the product in question and alternative designs', and 'that the magnitude
of the danger from the product outweighed the costs of avoiding danger[.]" ((alteration in original)
(quoting Warner FruehaufTrailer Co. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1275 (D.C. 1995)).
208. Hatsukami et al., supra note 27, at 310.
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then refrigerated until sale. 20 9 Moist snuff sold in the U.S., by contrast, is generally
fire cured and fermented, which "allow[s] the continued formation of TSNAs." 2 10
In addition, U.S. smokeless tobacco is generally not stored in refrigerated
displays. 211 As a result, a 2001 study conducted for the Massachusetts Tobacco
Control Program found:
The TSNA levels in the two leading U.S. snuff brands, accounting for
69% of the 1999 U.S. market, were found to increase during 6 months
storage at room temperature between 30 and 130%, while the TSNA
concentration in the Swedish brand increased inconsequentially.
212
The Massachusetts study concluded, "[t]he technology clearly exists to
manufacture snuff with low levels of TSNA, as shown by the Swedish [snus
products]. 2 13
While safer alternative designs clearly exist, this does not suggest that it will
be easy to prevail on claims against smokeless tobacco manufacturers. The
outcomes will likely vary by state, as some states will find that the common
knowledge that smokeless tobacco is generally "unsafe" provides a complete
defense, or that consumers of smokeless tobacco "assumed the risk" of harm.214 In
some states, statutory bars that have been erected to limit tobacco litigation will
prove an insurmountable hurdle.215 And of course, the individual plaintiff still must
establish that the product's defective design was responsible for his or her disease.
Despite these significant obstacles, however, product liability claims may
prove more viable than fraud-based claims and are more likely to produce public
health benefits. Regardless of the merits of a harm reduction strategy, no public
health purpose is served if smokeless tobacco products are more carcinogenic or
addictive than necessary. Lawsuits that make design defect claims will not get
smokeless tobacco products off the market, but they may push smokeless tobacco
209. J. Foulds et al., Effect of Smokeless Tobacco (Snus) on Smoking and Public Health in Sweden,
12 TOBACCO CONTROL 349, 349 (2003).
210. Id. at 349-50.
211. Id. at 350. Note that Camel Snus is being sold in refrigerated displays, unlike most smokeless
tobacco sold in the U.S. Taboka and Marlboro Snus are not refrigerated until sale. See Camel Snus,
supra note 39, (follow "All About Snus" hyperlink; then follow "Got Questions?" hyperlink; then
follow "Camel SNUS products are kept refrigerated at retail. Do you have to keep the product
refrigerated to ensure freshness?" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
212. K.D. BRUNNEMANN ET AL., AGING OF ORAL MOIST SNUFF AND THE YIELDS OF TOBACCO-
SPECIFIC N-NITROSAMINES (TSNA) 5 (2001), available at
http://www.tobacco.org/News/010622BostonRE.html.
213. Id.; see also Savitz et al., supra note 24, at 1937 ("Reduction of nitrosamine levels in smokeless
tobacco should markedly reduce carcinogenicity.").
214. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 424, 432 (Tex. 1997) (finding
that a cigarette company had a defense of common knowledge for wrongful death action).
215. E.g., TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.004(a) (Vernon 2005) ("[A] manufacturer or
seller shall not be liable if... the product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by
the ordinary consumer ... ").
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producers to adopt feasible design changes-like ending fermentation, refrigerating
unsold products, and ceasing the practice of manipulating pH levels-that will
make their products significantly safer.216
In all, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds appear to be assuming little additional
litigation exposure by entering the smokeless tobacco market. In fact, the
successful record of USST in defending litigation may have been one of the
encouraging signs that prompted the cigarette companies to move towards
smokeless tobacco production.217 For any smokeless tobacco litigation that they
face, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds are sure to adopt the same "scorched earth"
litigation tactics they have used to successfully defend smoking-related cases.
218
The litigation record and reputation of these two companies is enough on its own to
scare off most potential plaintiffs.
Just as with smoking-related lawsuits, litigation is clearly not a panacea that
will drive the smokeless tobacco industry into bankruptcy or provide adequate
compensation for those injured by smokeless tobacco use. Meaningful regulation of
the smokeless tobacco industry will have to come from legislation, not litigation.
2 9
Nonetheless, in the cigarette context, litigation has served an important purpose in
educating the public about the dangers of tobacco use and bringing the past abuses
of the tobacco industry to light.22° In the case of smokeless tobacco, narrowly-
focused litigation may serve to educate the public about the harms of smokeless
216. Where possible, regulatory strategies should also promote these same objectives. There is
evidence that in the past, the tobacco companies avoided exploring "safer" cigarette alternatives because
of the fear that it might increase their legal liability. Jess Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying
Lessons from Tobacco Litigation to Obesity Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 86 (2006) ("An
attorney warned R.J. Reynolds not to tell consumers about its efforts to produce a safe cigarette 'because
of two words: product liability."'). Regulations requiring feasible changes to smokeless tobacco
products could keep the tobacco companies from making similar decisions in response to smokeless
tobacco lawsuits.
217. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
218. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 172, at 64 ("The industry long has employed 'scorched earth'
litigation tactics designed to intimidate, embarrass, and bankrupt plaintiffs in smoking and health
litigation.... As a result, many are deterred from bringing claims against the companies whose products
have caused their own illness or their family member's death.").
219. A discussion of the merits of the bill currently pending in Congress to provide the Food and
Drug Administration with limited authority to regulate tobacco products is beyond the scope of this
paper. Likewise, this paper does not discuss the impact that such a bill might have on tobacco-related
litigation. Note, however, that some tobacco control advocates fear that FDA regulation of the tobacco
industry could be used as a shield by the industry in future litigation. M. Siegel, Food and Drug
Administration Regulation of Tobacco: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory, 13 TOBACCO
CONTROL 439, 439 (2004) ("[T]he Bill will end any serious threat to the tobacco companies posed by
current and future litigation. Tobacco companies will be able to successfully argue that they are already
regulated and that there is therefore no need for any further substantial punitive damages or injunctive
relief.").
220. Daynard, supra note 129, at 1.
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tobacco and the fact that the tobacco industry has made-and continues to make-
deliberate choices that increase the toxicity of smokeless tobacco products. Such
lawsuits may create pressure, even in the absence of large jury verdicts, for R.J.
Reynolds and Philip Morris to develop less toxic smokeless tobacco products.
221
These goals-accurately educating the public and reducing the lethality of
smokeless tobacco products currently on the market-are ones that both supporters
and opponents of smokeless tobacco harm reduction can endorse.
V. IMPACT ON CIGARETTE LITIGATION
In addition to considering whether litigation has a role to play in reducing the
harms from smokeless tobacco, a parallel consideration is whether R.J. Reynolds
and Philip Morris are increasing their potential exposure to cigarette-related
litigation by moving into the smokeless tobacco market. If the harm reduction
argument is taken seriously, it suggests that smokeless tobacco can be used as a
substitute for cigarettes and thereby reduce harm. If this is correct, would that mean
that smokeless tobacco is a "safer alternative design" for cigarette products? If so,
could that increase cigarette producers' vulnerability to products liability claims?
This is, of course, an issue of concern only to R.J. Reynolds and Philip
Morris, because none of the other smokeless tobacco producers also manufacture
222
cigarettes. 2 The other smokeless tobacco companies can freely argue that
smokeless tobacco is a substitute (indeed, a safer substitute) for cigarettes without
having to worry about the potential impact on cigarette litigation. R.J. Reynolds
and Philip Morris must worry, however, that any arguments they use to promote
their smokeless tobacco product may be used against them in tobacco-related
litigation.
A. Is Smokeless Tobacco a "Feasible Alternative Design "?
The inability to prove the existence of a "feasible alternative design" has
caused numerous products liability actions against cigarette manufacturers to
221. Cf Michelle M. Mello et al., The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability
for Obesity, 22 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 207, 212 (writing that "[e]ven if not successful,
fast-food litigation could motivate food makers to introduce voluntary changes in their business
practices," and suggesting that some such changes have already occurred). Wendy Wagner has also
suggested that private litigation can play the useful role of uncovering information that can later be used
to make better-informed regulatory decisions. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating
Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 710 (2007) ("Litigation... serves a vital role
in dropping inflated information costs and sparking public understanding and debate that in turn jump-
starts the market and political process.").
222. See supra Part III.A.
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fail.223 For example, the Texas Supreme Court, discussing a negligent design claim
in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, wrote:
Negligent design and manufacturing claims are predicated on the
existence of a safer alternative design for the product. Absent an
alternative design, a claim for negligent design or manufacturing fails as
a matter of law. As we previously discussed, American conclusively
proved that no reasonably safer alternative design exists for its
cigarettes. Accordingly, the Grinnells cannot maintain their claims for
negligent manufacturing and design as a matter of law.
224
Likewise, in Varney v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., the court dismissed negligent
design and breach of warranty claims, writing that "[a]lthough the plaintiff states..
• that safer alternative designs for cigarettes were available, there is not the slightest
description of what those designs were or why they would have avoided causing
harm to the plaintiff if adopted. 225
As discussed above, there may be "feasible alternative designs" available that
would make smokeless tobacco a safer product.226 But there is also the related
question of whether smokeless tobacco itself may be a "feasible alternative design"
for cigarettes.
The answer turns on whether smokeless tobacco products are an "alternative
design" for cigarettes or an entirely different product. Although it might seem self-
evident that smokeless tobacco is a different product than cigarettes, the claim that
it is actually an alternative design is not as implausible as it might appear at first
blush. Consider, for example, these statements made years ago in the tobacco
companies' internal documents:
In a sense, the tobacco industry may be thought of as being a
specialized, highly ritualized and stylized segment of the pharmaceutical
industry. Tobacco products, uniquely, contain and deliver nicotine, a
potent drug with a variety of physiological effects ... Nicotine is known
to be a habit-forming alkaloid, hence the confirmed user of tobacco
products is primarily seeking the physiological "satisfaction" derived
from nicotine-and perhaps other active compounds . . . . Thus a
tobacco product is, in essence, a vehicle for delivery of nicotine,
designed to deliver the nicotine in a generally acceptable and attractive
form.227 (R.J. Reynolds)
223. Am. Tobacco Co. Inc., v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 433 (Tex. 1997); Vamey v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.Mass. 2000); see also MATTHEW BENDER & CO., PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 56.05 (ed. 2006).
224. 951 S.W.2d at 437 (citations omitted).
225. 118F. Supp2dat70.
226. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
227. Memorandum from Claude E. Teague, Jr., R.J. Reynolds, Research Planning Memorandum on
the Nature of the Tobacco Business and the Crucial Role of Nicotine Therein (Apr. 14, 1972) (emphasis
added), http://ltdlimages.library.ucsf.edu/imagesd/d/w/y/dwy61c00/Sdwy61 c00.pdf
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The cigarette should be conceived not as a product but as a package.
The product is nicotine . . . . Think of a cigarette pack as a storage
container for a day's supply of nicotine . . . . Think of a cigarette as a
dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine.228 (Philip Morris)
Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling
nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress
mechanisms. 229 (Brown & Williamson)
If the "product" at issue is defined as a delivery device for nicotine-as the tobacco
companies' own documents suggest and as the FDA argued in the mid-1990s 23 0-
then smokeless tobacco could reasonably be considered a safer alternative design
for cigarettes.
In Kimball v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., an ongoing lawsuit involving lung
cancer developed from smoking "light" cigarettes, the judge wrote that the issue of
what constitutes a "feasible alternative design" and what constitutes an "entirely
different product" should be left to the jury.231 In rejecting R.J. Reynolds's motion
in limine to exclude evidence of alternative cigarette designs, the judge wrote:
RJR argues that Mr. Kimball cannot present evidence of alternative
cigarette designs that are "not cigarettes" or are safer only because no
one would use them. RJR raises an interesting question, but it is one that
the jury must decide. What is a cigarette? Is it a "Nicotine-Delivery
Device," as the Food and Drug Administration proposed in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129, 120 S. Ct.
1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000)? Is it a product for inhaling burning
tobacco? Some combination of the two? Something else entirely? These
questions are important, because Mr. Kimball cannot point to an entirely
different product as an alternative design. Cf Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac
Chem. Corp., 141 Wn.2d 493, 7 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2000) ("If
another product can more safely serve the same purpose as the
challenged product at a comparable cost and in a similar manner, a jury
should be able to conclude that the risks of the challenged product
outweigh its utility."). For example, a plaintiff injured in a motorcycle
accident cannot argue that if the manufacturer had installed four wheels
on the motorcycle, it would have been safer. "Two-wheeledness" is an
228. WILLIAM L. DuNN, JR., PHILIP MORRIS RESEARCH CENTER, MOTIVES AND INCENTIVES IN
CIGARETTE SMOKING 5 (n.d.), available at
http://ltdlimages.library.ucsf.edu/imagesw/w//o/wlo9OfDO/Swlo9OfOO.pdf
229. Memorandum from Addison Yeaman, Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., The Implications
of Battelle Hippo I & II and The Griffith Filter (July 17, 1963) (emphasis added), available at
http://ltdlimages.library.ucsf.edu/imagesx/x/r/c/xrc72dOO/Sxrc72dOO.pdf.
230. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127 (2000) ("The FDA determined
that nicotine is a 'drug' and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are 'drug delivery devices ... .
231. No. C03-664JLR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27138, at *7-8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2006).
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essential characteristic of a motorcycle. What are the essential
characteristics of a cigarette? The court can only hypothesize. The jury
will decide the issue, and will thus decide whether any alternative
design that Mr. Kimball proffers is a feasible alternative.232
In Kimball, the evidence the plaintiff was seeking to introduce involved "low
combustion" cigarette products such as Premier or Eclipse.233 The judge's
comments, however, suggest that the discussion of what constitutes a "feasible
alternative design" could be broadened to include smokeless tobacco products or
even nicotine replacement therapy. Indeed, at least one case has allowed evidence
of a nicotine inhaler to be introduced as an example of a feasible alternative
design.234
The tobacco companies' marketing of their new smokeless tobacco products
may make the "feasible alternative design" argument even more plausible. For
example, Philip Morris is using the marketing slogan "Instead of a Smoke... tuck
a Taboka, ' '235 and its fact sheet for Taboka says that the product is "designed
especially for adult smokers interested in smokeless tobacco alternatives to
smoking." 236 R.J. Reynolds, for its part, has stated that "we should not delay in
allowing snus to compete with cigarettes for market share, 237 and some of its
23
advertisements have targeted current smokers. 38 And although R.J. Reynolds and
Philip Morris have not made any explicit harm reduction claims on behalf of their
smokeless tobacco products, USST has argued to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services that "any comprehensive evidence-based tobacco control
program should include a tobacco harm reduction strategy [providing that] cigarette
smokers who do not quit and do not use medical nicotine products should be
encouraged to switch completely to smokeless tobacco .... 239 Such advertising
and public statements make it substantially easier for plaintiffs to argue that
232. Id.
233. Id. at *4-7.
234. Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp 2d 480, 496-97 (D.S.C. 2001). In
that case, the jury ultimately issued a verdict for the defense.
235. John Reid Blackwell, Philip Morris to Test Smokeless, Spit-Free Product, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, May 3, 2006, at Al.
236. Philip Morris USA, Taboka Fact Sheet,
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/smokeless/popup taboka fact sheet.asp (last visited Nov. 17,
2007).
237. Reynolds Am. Inc., supra note 122.
238. Some of its direct mail pieces have offered free samples of snus in exchange for cigarette proofs
of purchase. Camel Snus Advertisements (on file with author). This could be seen as an attempt to get
current smokers to switch to smokeless tobacco, or, as noted above, it could also be seen as an attempt to
promote dual use.
239. Comments of U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co. Regarding Tobacco Harm Reduction Submitted to
the U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 62, at 9.
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smokeless tobacco is an "alternative" to cigarettes and not a completely different
product.240
Of course, to win a verdict, a plaintiff would still have to persuade a jury that
smokeless tobacco is a "feasible alternative design" for cigarettes, and juries may
well resist accepting an argument that goes against their first instincts. To date, no
such argument has succeeded. But as smokeless tobacco producers (and harm
reduction advocates) push for smokeless tobacco to be considered an alternative
option for smokers, this argument will become easier over time. 241 Note, though,
that even with success in establishing smokeless tobacco as a "feasible alternative
design," it would still be extraordinarily difficult to win a smoking-related case (in
242part because of issues like causation and reliance, as discussed above). At the
very least, though, success on that issue would allow plaintiffs to get past one
major obstacle to recovery in smoking liability cases.
B. Public Health Implications
Would it advance the interests of public health to argue that smokeless
tobacco is a "feasible alternative design" for cigarettes? In theory, successful
litigation that focused on smokeless tobacco as a "feasible alternative design"
would eventually force tobacco companies to produce smokeless tobacco instead of
cigarettes (or else face escalating legal costs and judgments). The public health
benefits of such a result would be undeniable. However, the end of cigarette
production is not a likely outcome or even a realistic possibility in the short term.
If such litigation did not succeed in ending cigarette production, then what
purpose would it serve? At least in the case of R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris, it
may make the companies wary of asserting any marketing claims that would
position smokeless tobacco as an alternative option for smokers. They might
become more cautious about making any public statements that could later be used
to support a "feasible alternative design" argument.
To date, though, these companies have not shown any concern about the
possible litigation ramifications of offering "spit-free" smokeless products as an
alternative to cigarettes-indeed, this is precisely how they have been pitching their
products. Philip Morris, for example, says that "Marlboro Snus pouches were
designed especially for adult smokers who are interested in smokeless tobacco
240. Moreover, the development of "spit-free" products that can be used in any setting also makes
such an argument easier. One could argue that traditional moist snuff products are not an acceptable
alternative because of the social stigma that may be attached to spitting tobacco. The fact that new
products are "spit-free" may undercut that line of reasoning.
241. Use of cigarette brand names to advertise smokeless tobacco products may also make jurors
more willing to accept the "feasible alternative design argument."
242. See supra Part IV.
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alternatives to cigarettes.243 Likewise, Inga, the Camel Snus spokesmodel, makes
this statement on the Camel Snus website: "In our society, there are many public
spaces where smoking is not acceptable. These are the perfect places to make like a
Swede and snus.",244 Indeed, the simple fact that both companies are using cigarette
brand names (Marlboro and Camel, respectively) to promote these products
suggests that they view cigarettes and smokeless products as alternatives to one
another.245
From a public health point of view, a legal strategy that would threaten the
ability of tobacco companies to market smokeless tobacco products to current
smokers (as an alternative to cigarettes) could be counterproductive. Viewed from a
harm reduction perspective, these are exactly the customers (indeed, the only
customers) that should be encouraged to consider smokeless tobacco as an option.
On the other hand, such a litigation strategy could benefit public health if it
significantly reduced the overall amount of smokeless tobacco marketing by Philip
Morris and R.J. Reynolds. This is especially important as both companies are now
using cigarette brand names to market their smokeless tobacco products. Any
smokeless tobacco advertising will have the negative side-effect of cross-promoting
the cigarette brands. Likewise, smokeless tobacco advertising, even if directed to
current smokers, will surely miss the intended audience to some degree and
encourage others (such as youth or non-smokers) to use smokeless tobacco.246 As
discussed above in Part II, current marketing by R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris is
not carefully focused on existing smokers, and it would be foolish to expect
companies with their track records to market their products responsibly. Thus, any
strategy which serves to discourage smokeless tobacco advertising will likely
benefit public health.
Moreover, if tobacco companies were discouraged from advertising
smokeless tobacco to current smokers, public health professionals and tobacco
control advocates would be freer to communicate directly with current tobacco
users without as much competition from industry-funded mixed messages. Such
communications would obviously present counseling, nicotine replacement
therapy, and other tobacco cessation options as preferable to smokeless tobacco use
(as indeed they are).247
243. Philip Morris USA, Marlboro Snus New Product Fact Sheet (emphasis added),
http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/popup marlboro snus fact sheet.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
244. Camel Snus, supra note 39 (follow "Meet Inga" hyperlink; then follow "Inga's Introduction to
Snus" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 20, 2007).
245. Id.; Philip Morris USA, supra note 48.
246. See Savitz et al., supra note 24, at 1937.
247. Some tobacco control advocates would prefer to leave smokeless tobacco out of the
conversation entirely. These advocates are concerned that any discussion of the relative risks of smoking
and smokeless tobacco, could be misinterpreted as an endorsement of smokeless tobacco use. But
ignoring the topic completely is no longer practical, and tobacco control advocates should not shy away
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The lawsuits themselves-if granted a high enough profile in the media-
may also serve to educate the public about the relative risks of smoking, smokeless
tobacco, and nicotine replacement products, just as previous rounds of litigation
have educated the public about the dangers of cigarettes.248 Public health advocates
should welcome such a result. There are still major misperceptions among cigarette
smokers about the comparative risks of these products, and in some cases these
misperceptions are used as justifications to continue smoking.249
Finally, if the "feasible altemative design" argument makes it easier to win
verdicts against the cigarette manufacturers, such legal victories will build upon the
successes of previous cigarette litigation--enhanced awareness of the dangers of
smoking, delegitimization of the tobacco industry in the public sphere,
compensation for at least some victims of the tobacco industry's wrongdoings, and
increased legal costs for the cigarette producers (which could eventually result in
higher cigarette prices that reduce use). That such legal tactics might short-circuit
tobacco industry advertising intended to encourage cigarette smokers to switch to
smokeless tobacco seems to be a risk worth taking, particularly given the
unlikelihood that tobacco industry advertisements will be narrowly targeted to
current smokers.
25 0
from this topic. Failure to acknowledge the disparity in risk between cigarettes and smokeless tobacco-
as some public health websites have done-undermines the credibility of tobacco control advocates and
allows tobacco companies to claim the moral high ground on this issue. See generally Carl V. Philips et
al., You Might as Well Smoke; The Misleading and Harmful Public Message About Smokeless Tobacco,
5 BMC PUB. HEALTH 31 (2005), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1417-2458/5/31/
(providing examples of public health websites with inaccurate information about the relative risks of
smokeless tobacco, such as the World Health Organization website which states that "smokeless tobacco
is just as addictive and fatal as cigarettes). It is far better to accurately communicate the risks of
smokeless tobacco while also discussing the relative safety of nicotine replacement therapy and other
cessation products. Communication of accurate information need not imply endorsement of a tobacco
harm reduction approach.
248. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., K. Michael Cummings et al., Are Smokers Adequately Informed About the Health
Risks of Smoking and Medicinal Nicotine?, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH (Supp.) S333, S336-37
tbl.3 (2004) (surveying smokers and finding that only 33% knew that nicotine is not a cause of cancer
and only 35% knew nicotine patches are less likely to cause a heart attack than smoking cigarettes);
Richard J. O'Connor et al., Smoker Awareness of and Beliefs About Supposedly Less-Harmful Tobacco
Products, 29 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 85, 88 (2005) (surveying current smokers and finding that of
those who were aware of smokeless tobacco products, 83% did not believe that smokeless tobacco use
was less harmful than smoking).
250. See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, SMOKELESS TOBACCO AND KIDS (May 25, 2006),
http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0003.pdf (describing ways tobacco companies
continue to market to youth despite settlement agreements including sponsorship at a number of sporting
events and advertisements in college newspapers for smokeless tobacco products). One other possible
downside of this litigation strategy is the potential for legislative backlash. Both Philip Morris and R.J.
Reynolds are politically powerful companies, and they might attempt to short circuit this litigation
strategy by seeking enactment of protective legislation. Cf Peter D. Jacobson and Soheil Soliman,
Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 231-32 (2002)
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C. Will Smokeless Tobacco Sales Strengthen the Cigarette Companies Position
in Cigarette Litigation?
Although the "feasible alternative design" argument may make it easier for
plaintiffs to prevail in cigarette-related litigation, some have made the contrary
suggestion that cigarette companies are entering the smokeless tobacco market
because they believe it will reduce their exposure in cigarette-related litigation. For
example, Jonathan Foulds has suggested that Philip Morris has designed smokeless
tobacco products that are intended to be market failures, simply for the purpose of
reducing the company's litigation exposure (and maintaining its hold on the
cigarette market).251 He writes:
Philip Morris has by far the largest share (around 50%) of the US
cigarette market. Philip Morris wants the status quo to continue. It
therefore may not want lots of smokers switching from its deadly
cigarettes to a much less harmful smokeless product. But it doesn't want
to run the legal risk of losing a court case on the basis that it needlessly
caused people to die of lung cancer when they could have sold tobacco
products that don't cause lung cancer ... So how do they minimize the
risks? . . . [T]hey claim to have spent millions of dollars trying to get
smokers to switch to a less harmful smokeless product, but
unfortunately find that smokers don't really like the much less harmful
(and less addictive) smokeless product they offered. So the product dies
a death, smokers keep smoking one of the dozens of varieties of lethal
Marlboro cigarettes, and the company can claim in court that they tried,
but smokers really just want to keep puffing on their yummy
cigarettes. 52
Putting aside the question of whether the cigarette companies' products are
intentionally designed to fail (which is nearly impossible to determine at this point),
Foulds raises the question of whether the tobacco companies' entrance into the
smokeless tobacco market is at least in part a public relations gambit intended to
protect the company from legal liability. 253 By offering lower-risk tobacco
products, the tobacco companies can claim that people who chose to smoke
cigarettes are responsible for their own choice to use the most dangerous tobacco
option available (i.e., they "assumed the risk"). Such an argument could be used to
appeal to juries in cigarette cases, or it could be targeted more broadly at potential
(discussing how municipal suits against the gun industry were met by state laws that prohibited such
lawsuits).
251. Posting of Jonathan Foulds to Healthline, Why Did Philip Morris's New Smokeless Tobacco
Product ("Taboka") Deliver Almost No Nicotine?,
http://www.healthline.com/blogs/smokingcessation/2007/06/why-did-philip-morriss-new-
smokeless.html (June 12, 2007).
252. Id.
253. Id.
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future jurors through the media and advertising. A recent press release by R.J.
Reynolds, for example, repeatedly used the term "relative risk" in describing the
range tobacco products it now offers. 254 The company stated, "we should not delay
in allowing snus to compete with cigarettes for market share, and we should be
prepared to accurately inform smokers about the relative risks of cigarettes, snus,
and approved smoking-cessation medications. 255 Such statements could be used in
the future by R.J. Reynolds to indicate that it has worked to educate smokers about
the relative risk of tobacco products, and thus should not be responsible when
people choose to use cigarettes.
If this is indeed the cigarette companies' strategy, it may succeed as a public
relations matter. The companies have already invested heavily-for decades-in
promoting the idea that smoking is an "adult choice" and a "right., 256 As McDaniel
and Malone write, Philip Morris's regulatory and public relations strategy has long
been focused on:
[R]efram[ing] tobacco from a public health problem to an issue of
individual choice. This strategy taps into American ideals of individual
freedom, and in turn portrays public health advocates as extremists who
support government intrusion into private decision making.25
7
Such arguments have been internalized by the American public. Most
Americans now "agree that the public should have a right to smoke," even though
there is often a public clamor to ban products that pose far less of a public health
risk.258 (As McDaniel and Malone note, the dietary supplement Ephedra was
banned after being linked to the deaths of 155 people.2 59) Thus, as a public relations
strategy, highlighting the "continuum of risk" of various tobacco products may help
254. Reynolds Am. Inc., supra note 122.
255. Id.
256. E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company - Smoker's Rights,
http://www.jrt.com/rights/legSmokers.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
257. P.A. McDaniel & R.E. Malone, Understanding Philip Morris's Pursuit of U.S. Government
Regulation of Tobacco, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 193, 197 (2005); accord Michael S. Givel & Stanton A.
Glantz, Tobacco Lobby Political Influence on US State Legislatures in the 1990s, 10 TOBACCO
CONTROL, 124, 125 (2001); Claudia L. Menashe & Michael Siegel, The Power of a Frame: An Analysis
of Newspaper Coverage of Tobacco Issues, 3 J. HEALTH COMM. 307, 321 (1998) ("[Tihe tobacco
industry has been steadfast in consistently targeting core human values as its dominant framing tactic.
The three dominant tobacco interest frames (positive economic force, moralizing/hostility/prohibition,
and free speech/legal product) conjure up images of an America whose citizens are free to pursue
happiness and the American dream by making their own choices in an environment of economic
prosperity.").
258. James Shanahan et al., Cultivation and Spiral of Silence Effects: The Case of Smoking, 7 MASS
COMM. & Soc. 413,425 (2004).
259. McDaniel & Malone, supra note 257, at 197.
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the cigarette companies in their continuing quest to rehabilitate their public
260image.
As a legal matter, though, an argument that a company should be excused
from legal liability for its most deadly products because it also produces alternative
products that are less deadly is not terribly compelling 261 As suggested above,
tobacco companies would be in a stronger position if they could argue that there is
no available alternative to cigarettes and that they should be therefore excused from
liability because they produce an "inherently unsafe" product.262 The availability of
a safer alternative is generally grounds for making a finding of liability more likely,
not less likely.263 Indeed, a comment to the Third Restatement of Torts explicitly
provides that "[w]arnings are not . . . a substitute for the provision of a reasonably
safe design. ' M  A contrary rule would only encourage the proliferation of
dangerous products by "finding products to be not defective that could easily have
been designed safer without great expense or effect on the benefits or functions to
be served by the product.,
265
Moreover, whether or not R.J. Reynolds's and Philip Morris's new smokeless
products flop in the marketplace, plaintiffs can still present the general category of
smokeless tobacco products as a feasible alternative design. Even though there are
some early negative reports of Taboka sales, smokeless tobacco sales continue to
increase overall by three or four percent each year. 266 Thus, if the tobacco
260. Reynolds Am. Inc., supra note 122. Alternatively, given the fact that most Americans believe
that smokeless tobacco is as harmful as smoking, it is questionable how effective highlighting the risk
would be as a public relations strategy. C. Keith Haddock et al., Modified Tobacco Use and Lifestyle
Change in Risk-Reducing Beliefs About Smoking, 27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 35, 37 (2004) ( "[More
than] 75% of men and 80% of women believed there was no health advantage of smokeless tobacco use
over smoking.").
261. Cf Perez v. Michael Weinig, Inc., No. Civ.A. 304CV0448, 2005 WL 1630018, at *6 (D. La.
July 7, 2005) (declining to adopt a defense that would allow manufacturers to place the blame on the
consumer for choosing an unsafe product in stead of selecting the safer, but still unsafe, alternative).
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k (1965). Some states have provided statutory
immunity for products that are "inherently unsafe." See Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Products Liability:
Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products, 36 A.L.R. 5TH 541, 588-89 (1996).
263. Indeed, several courts held that once a prime facie products liability case has been established,
"the manufacturer has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a feasible, safe alternative design."
Burden of Proving Feasibility of Alternative Safe Design in Products Liability Action Based on
Defective Design, 78 A.L.R. 4TH 154, § 2a (2007) (listing cases in § 7).
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 1 (1998). The comment
further states that "[i]n general, when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and risks can
reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safer design is required over a warning that
leaves a significant residuum of such risks." Id.
265. W. P. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984).
266. Philip Morris' Taboka Snuff Has Sold Poorly, Analyst Says, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 26, 2007
at Dl; Vanessa O'Connell, Marlboro Brand Goes Smokeless, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2007, at A3 ("Unlike
the cigarette market, where volume sales have fallen every year since the 1970s, smokeless-tobacco
volumes have been growing at an average annual rate of 3% to 4% for more than a decade .... ").
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companies' goal was to reduce potential legal liability, setting up their smokeless
products to fail would seem to be a poor strategy.
Of course, tobacco companies will continue to argue in court, as they have in
the past, that smoking is an "adult choice" (despite the fact that most smokers
became addicted to cigarettes as minors) and that the public is well-informed of the
health risks of smoking (despite the companies' decades-long conspiracy to
mislead the public about the dangers of smoking).267 These arguments, however, do
not rely on the cigarette companies' efforts to enter the smokeless tobacco market,
and the fact that they are now producing such products will not significantly add to
or detract from the force of their arguments. Indeed, the legal impact of the tobacco
companies' entrance into the smokeless tobacco market, if any, is likely to be on
the side of the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The debate about smokeless tobacco harm reduction is just heating up and is
likely to go on for some time. In June 2007, The Lancet brought some additional
visibility to the issue, publishing two articles and an editorial about snus use.
26 8
One of the articles, by Coral Gartner and others, concluded that "smokers who
switch to snus rather than continuing to smoke can realise substantial health gains"
and that "[i]t is unlikely that these health gains would be offset by the adverse
health effects of snus use., 26 9 The Lancet's editorial, however, disagreed with
Gartner's suggestion that health departments should promote snus, instead
recommending that "clinicians advise their smoking patients on more flexible ways
to quit smoking with existing approved medicines, rather than with snus.
270
Despite the strong opinions on both sides of this debate, differences of
opinion should not prevent tobacco control advocates from working together on
points of agreement. The cigarette companies' entrance into the smokeless tobacco
market is a clear sign that the issue of smokeless tobacco is of growing importance,
and it is critically important for public health voices to respond to this latest
development. As outlined in this article, tobacco control advocates should, at a
minimum, be able to agree that smokeless tobacco products should not be marketed
to minors and that tobacco producers should not be allowed to market smokeless
tobacco products that are deliberately engineered to be more toxic than necessary.
Public' health advocates and attorneys can develop regulatory and litigation
267. Milberger et al., supra note 155, at iv22.
268. See Jonathan Foulds & Lynn Kozlowski, Comment, Snus-What Should the Public-Health
Response Be?, 369 LANCET 1976 (2007); Coral E. Gartner et al., Assessment of Swedish Snus for
Tobacco Harm Reduction: An Epidemiological Modeling Study, 369 LANCET 2010 (2007); Juhua Luo et
al., Oral Use of Swedish Moist Snuff (Snus) and Risk for Cancer of the Mouth, Lung, and Pancreas in
Male Construction Workers: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 369 LANCET 2015 (2007).
269. Gartner et al., supra note 268, at 2014.
270. Id. at 1977.
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responses that further these goals, including active enforcement of the MSA and
product liability cases that take aim at the design of smokeless tobacco products.
What (if any) impact the growing focus on smokeless tobacco may have on
cigarette-related litigation is less certain. In theory, pointing to smokeless tobacco
as a "feasible alternative design" may open up a crack in the tobacco companies'
defenses that will allow more lawsuits to succeed. The way in which the major
cigarette companies are marketing their smokeless tobacco products may even help
facilitate this development. In the short term, it is unlikely that judges and juries
will be overly receptive to such an argument. But unless legislators act first, it is
inevitable that judges and juries will eventually conclude that a less harmful
alternative should replace the most deadly consumer product ever produced.
Whether the less harmful alternative will be smokeless tobacco is yet to be
determined.

